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
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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

OBLOQUY AND LIFE

¶ One of the most touching episodes in any literature occurs in the letter of the outlawed Chinese General Li Ling to his old time friend Su Wu.

¶ Both had been captured in one of the many campaigns against the Mongols. Su Wu, after great privation, was returned to China, to the acclaim of the people, and to the favor of the Emperor.

¶ Li Ling was equally worthy, for he had launched on a desperate mission for the Emperor and had carried the early campaign to success against what had seemed insuperable odds. Far in the land of the enemy, because assistance from home was denied him, his worn and starving soldiers were at last overcome by superior numbers, and himself taken prisoner.

¶ The immediate punishment for defeat was banishment for himself and death for the innocent members of his family.

¶ He was given no opportunity for a hearing by the Emperor, in whose cause he had risked and lost everything. The custom of the country in such a case indicated suicide. This seemed to him tantamount to a confession of guilt. He therefore chose the more difficult way of life, hoping that he might eventually

clear his name of dishonor. So he writes to his old friend: "I therefore steeled myself to obloquy and life."

¶ Herein is presented one of the oldest and completest tragedies.

¶ It was not merely that a man must live on after all the rewards of life had been snatched away. Many a man has awakened in the morning to find that all he has built up by a life of effort lies suddenly levelled in heaps about him.

¶ Many a man, likewise, has seen those higher values of light and love, the impetus of all his striving, plucked from him by the remorselessness of disease, accident, and death.

¶ The depth of this tragedy lay not in the disloyalty of supposed friends, those who walked with averted faces, and who were less warm in their greetings. At such underlings the brave man can mock.

¶ Nor did the profoundest suffering spring from the turpidity of the Emperor, who in rage had turned to destroy him, to put the traitor's price upon his head, to confiscate his property, and to massacre his family.

¶ The full measure of bitterness was, as always, internal. It had to do with the integrity of his own soul. His action constitutes the eternal argument against suicide.

¶ Appearances were against him. He had been condemned by circumstantial evidence that had overlooked altogether his past and had ruthlessly wiped out of the account the singleness of his devotion, the completeness of his sacrifice.

¶ Like Job, all he had left was the conscious witness of his own soul. They were quite wrong who advised him, like Job's wife, to "say goodbye to God and die." To do this was to throw away his last resource. Only God could be his inalienable portion forever.

¶ For this it was that he "steeled himself to obloquy and life."

R. T. F.

The Personalist

CHINA AND THE COMING CIVILIZATION

By THE EDITOR

IN the long sweep of history civilizations bear marks as definite as the layers of strata that separate the geologic ages, but like these can be discerned clearly only after they have passed away.

Europe was awakened from preoccupation with local affairs first by the Crusades and then by the newly discovered luxuries which were introduced from the Orient. Marco Polo's account of his travels helped to release from restraining inhibitions a tide of adventurers who laid the foundations for the era of exploitation that began with the conquest of the sea. At no period of Western history since, until the present, has there appeared such a confluence of new ideas with revolutionary implications. Medievalism, which had raised its bulwarks against the waves of Mohammedan migration, reached the climax of power and expression in Gothic architecture and Aquinian theology. With these outstanding achievements it spent its force and lived on only as the ghost of a former greatness.

The new age was marked for adventure and democracy. It was characterized by the change from land to water transportation. The era of sea-power came in and has lasted until our own time.

We are now perchance at the beginning of another sea-change, partly affected by new means of transport, partly from other forces that are at work. There are many indica-

tions of mutation in the intellectual atmosphere, changes that affect the basic modes of men's thoughts. The first of these is to be seen in the scientific revolution which marks off the old from the new as distinctly as did the Ptolemaic from the Copernican astronomy. The age of Relativism is an age of change from hitherto prevailing Positivism. The old materialistic interpretation of nature transposes to a spiritualistic one. This cannot be without repercussions beyond our power to visualize. An attendant symptom is the presence of confusion in religious and moral convictions, which matches in moral relativism that of science, which means that men are faced with new social problems and standards. Transition is marked in the political upheavals of the present in which there seem to be no formulated policies nor generally accepted ideals along which civilization is consciously building. New means of transport and communication can scarcely fail to bring changes as drastic as those brought by the clipper ships and the introduction of steam. Only the results promise to be vaster in proportion to the greater change and the larger populations now involved. Another change to be reckoned with is the development in economic wants now taking place among peoples of lower standards of living. These and many other influences indicate the putting off of the old and the achievement of a new civilization. In this new consummation of culture, the largest territorial, racial and intellectual group of people, especially one comprising a fifth of the population of the earth, is certain to play an important part. Upon the reactions of the Chinese people may depend the destinies of tomorrow.

I.

The Apogee and Decline of Sea-Power

The evaluation of the dependence of the West upon sea-power was the theme of Captain Mahan in various volumes

and monographs which became a sort of Bible to the naval experts. So, to speak of the decline of sea-power will seem to some like announcing a new twilight of the gods, a modern Götterdämmerung. The suggestions here made can lay no claim to expertness or authority, nor can they be bolstered by orthodox tomes on world politics. They are simple suggestions that arise on viewing the present world situation. No harm will have been done by raising these questions since only an unquestioning state of orthodoxy is ever inimical to the truth.

The rise of sea-power was based, as Captain Mahan clearly shows, upon the need for and prosecution of commerce. It supplies the arterial circulation of a society made up of widely separated areas which are predominantly industrial or agricultural. The industrial area must have food and raw materials, the agricultural area must have manufactured goods. Evidently the highest economy for the race lies in the possibility of the shortest transport.

This so simple postulate is not, however, the whole story of modern commerce. Commerce is built upon differences in products owing to difference in climates or soils, or upon manufactures depending upon localities for raw materials, or places in which there is an abundance of highly skilled artisans not easily duplicated.

The basis just mentioned, difference in climatic products, or of localized products or of artisanship, may well continue indefinitely to feed the world's trade, but of themselves they offer only modest gains and none of those extreme profits that sometimes brought the old sailing ships home in great excitement as they offered a gain five times the original investment, and represented what was little better than gambling and piracy. It was this piracy that our navies were largely built to protect, though the gainers by them

passed the bill on to the common people, who received scant portion of the protection and reward.

The reason for the great wealth which modern commerce has made possible to a few depended basically upon the existence of contrasting levels of economic welfare, as surely as ever did the wealth of the slaveholding states. The existence of this disparity in economic level has made it possible for peoples more scientifically advanced to exchange cheaply-made factory goods for others, which in actual hours of toil represented much greater values. The owners of the machines have profited by this disparity, passing on to their own workers such portions as they were forced to at the price of economic war.

The unreasonable extension of commerce, if one may be allowed the expression, has been due to the gambling instinct for great profits from small investments. The possibility of such profits disappears, however, with the economic disparities which made them possible. Powers built upon exploitation cease when the possibility of exploitation ends. Growing intelligence in the less favored countries, general betterment of economic conditions, and the introduction of machinery change the whole balance of things irremediably. The introduction of the cotton-mill into Asia, for instance, while profitable to a small group, tends to shut down the mill owned perhaps by the same group in America, and to transfer the advantage to the group of lower economic level, unless the management can provide indefinitely against sharing with the workers the profits. Many of our staple manufacturers are now engaged in burning their candles at both ends in their selfish greed for quick profits.

These are the forces of the modern world which are tending to shut off the distant exchange of goods, and with the decline of trade there must come a decline in ships, and of

necessity for great navies, unless the economic wants aroused by higher standards of living can be greatly and universally increased, along with opportunities for enjoyment. No one nation, continent or race can do this. It is an affair of world understanding, planning and coöperation. The decline of the importance of sea-power which now threatens may be greatly expedited by the general destruction of navies in the next great war, for which the remotest nations seem everywhere now preparing. That the nation emerging from that war with a navy still on its hands may become the most embarrassed is something more than a guess, since the future power will lie in the hands of those who have turned attention not to commerce but to internal development.

II.

The Illusions of Foreign Commerce

The possibilities thus faced add point to the recent comment of Samuel Crowther on the report presented to the President of the United States on the foreign commerce of America during the last thirty-eight years. This comment was that there is no greater illusion than that the chief source of national wealth lies in the extension of foreign commerce. We have assumed the importance of foreign commerce for nations of large land areas as well as for those of small extent. Under this illusion the increase of internal commerce and the importance of home markets has been relatively neglected, even to the extent of selling at lower prices abroad than to the people at home. The sound bases, and enduring, of foreign commerce are much more limited than we had supposed, being more or less confined to the aforementioned, climatic, seasonal or local products. Aside from these, enduring and dependable trade must be sought in the internal development of trade between the industrial and agricultural sections of a given area or nation. Wis-

dom would seem to dictate the importance to any nation of the development of internal means of transport and communication. The author just mentioned shows that for the United States the net results of the encouragement we have given commerce has been the draining of the country of \$23,000,000,000.00 worth of goods, payment for which has been either indefinitely postponed or repudiated altogether. This makes no account of the other billions we have spent to make this trade possible or to maintain a navy to protect it. It is now proposed to add other colossal sums to this expense that we may go still further "in the hole."

As has already been suggested, the winner of the next war may be left bankrupt, with ships that will be an embarrassment because time will quickly render them obsolete, and in her cockiness she will not, with the fruits of victory on her hands, have the sense to turn to the internal development of her own people. A standing illustration of this is already to be seen in the case of the Leviathan, which we might better sink than own, from the standpoint of economy. A nation still pursuing the old phantom might easily find herself outdistanced in industrial progress by other nations possessing no such *impedimenta*. That there is a conceivable limit to sea-power seems indicated by the famous debacle of Scapa Flow.

In the face of these considerations, the suggestion of Owen Lattimore that the future of national power lies with the possession of great land areas, and no longer with the possession of ships, comes with new and startling force.

III.

Science and the Cultural Revolution

These arguments become even more cogent under the light of the cultural revolution which has been and is being

wrought through the discoveries of science. The invention of machinery calls for a high degree of technical skill and also, as most people overlook, a degree of personal initiative, that can be had only with a large degree of personal freedom. A slave or Fascist generation cannot be a creative one. Not only must there be freedom for the creative individual politically, but freedom must be the basis of his cultural background and he must be free also to make profit for himself or in some distinguished way for society. Machines can be used, on the other hand, by people of slight technical knowledge. There is a question whether some machines in our modern factory are not best attended by intellectual morons, who drop easily into machine-like efficiency, undisturbed by thoughts or aspirations of any kind. The machine obviates the necessity for thought. The stark idiocy to which many modern factory operations tend has not been given the attention by sociologists and psychologists that it deserves.

The West, in its greed for profit, has placed its machines in the hands of peoples of low economic and educational privilege, with the result that we are now being undersold in the world markets, and if our dependence is still to be in foreign trade we must fall to the same level of poverty and ignorance. Under such conditions the cause of a free democracy is lost forever. This condition has been superficially looked upon as only a temporary situation, but there is no reason why it should not continue until the lower level is reached or the machines wear out. The machine has in the lowering process already wiped out much of individual skill, artistry and pride of achievement and for quality has substituted cheapness and quantity.

Any advantage which the more progressive nations now enjoy at this game is likely to be but temporary. To see

this one needs but to visualize the full factory-ization of the teeming populations of China and India, with their impoverished order of living and low wages, to realize how profound is the menace to western standards. The Orient must rise to our economic well-being or we must sink to hers. This is the problem which China now presents, with her great land areas, her immense population, and her already overcrowded agricultural districts feeling the call of the industrial possibilities of her cities.

IV.

The Menace of a New Slavery

A fact quite generally overlooked at this time is the background which has made possible the scientific discoveries and progress of the last hundred and fifty years.

But little prior to that date it is common knowledge that in many respects Chinese civilization might justly have claimed superiority to the culture of the West. A partial census of ideas and discoveries that came into European knowledge through contact with China bears powerful testimony to the influence of a proud and superior civilization. Some of these were, either directly or indirectly: silk and sericulture, tea and its cultivation, the mariner's compass, gunpowder, paper and paper-making, printing both from blocks and from movable type, paper money as legal tender, taxes on land, porcelain making, ink and pens, organized fire-departments, census, and police reports on transients, free public education, and *laissez faire* political economy, to mention but a few. To ponder upon this list is to be tempted away from our main theme, and in that respect to spend a disparate contemplation on the inestimable debt which western scientific discovery owes to China.

Out of it two questions come immediately to mind. One

is: What is the influence which in Chinese history checked the development of these discoveries until the western world, then less advanced, could catch up? The other is: What were the influences at work in the West which enabled men who had not made the original inventions to take them up and give them a development which has changed the physical conditions of the world's life? The answers to both questions exhibit the presence of an identical principle. The force that blighted early Chinese scientific discovery was due to resistance of innovations of all kinds by an increasingly autocratic government, and a philosophy that brooked no controversy among the masses. All discoveries had to be announced directly to the public officials. Many were directly suppressed, as in the case of the discovery of the art of distilling alcohol, which though reported in rigid keeping with the law, resulted in the exile of the discoverer, who was happy at not being decapitated. In fact, one could not change the pattern of a dipper without incurring the penalty of decapitation.

The answer to the second question is but the converse of the first. Knowledge of Chinese invention came to Europe in the midst of the struggle for religious, political, and intellectual freedom, which was characterized by the Revival of Letters, the Reformation, and the struggle for Democracy. The background of this movement was intellectual and spiritual. The spiritual element was the creative one. The release of men's minds and souls from the thralldom of centuries was the great spur to the creative imagination which laid the secure basis for scientific discovery. Freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, of investigation, of travel and trade, of press and speech, these were the liberating forces from which the advances of the following period sprang. Let no one be deceived; creative genius and religion go hand in hand in mutual reaction, and are the concomit-

ants of personal freedom. It was the absence of this principle from Chinese life that witnessed or provided the setback of her early scientific genius. It was its presence which grounded the Western advance, and again it can be lost if these liberating forces cease through repression of any kind.

There is no assurance that scientific progress will continue among any people or race which cuts itself adrift from the cherishing of the principles of democracy and freedom. We have no other insurance against the blighting of our present hopes and dreams. This, however, seems so improbable from the haughty position of the present that the unbelieving cannot be convinced. Let us give the warning some further reflection.

Is there anywhere in the world, you may ask, any power that could presumably set the end of scientific progress? Here again the answer must be two-fold.

The first reply must be based on the consideration of the external forces which might bring about the collapse of scientific investigation. One needs only to look about the world to discover very sinister forces already making in this direction, however unconsciously. Most menacing is the world-wide reaction against freedom that has characterized the period since the great war. The steady resurgence of narrow nationalisms which have grown out of political fear and which have been apparent in the irresponsible dictatorships that rule so large a portion of society at this hour are an evidence of a universal despair of democracy. In such states there is nothing so certain as the early checking of scientific research and opinion which has already set in. Such repression will eventually lead back to the doddering pedantry of the Dark Ages unless they in turn are checked by new demands for democracy.

Narrowing nationalisms are not, however, the only sinister interests or powers in the situation. A notable slowing up of invention has been apparent in America and elsewhere through the tyranny of vested interests. Improvement of telephone service, for instance, is many years belated by the buying up and suppression of all inventions, since profits are considered of more importance than service. Such policies are short-sighted, it is true, as is now clearly evident in antiquated railway comforts, in which there has been little improvement in seventy-five years. Only the outgrowing of such service by airplane and automobile, with consequent decreased profits and bankruptcy, has been able to induce any change whatever from the old type of coach that brought back the body of Abraham Lincoln from Washington to Springfield, Illinois.

By far the greatest menace to scientific progress is not external but internal. The source of these fine enthusiasms, these creative dreams of social, political, religious, and even physical progress is within the spirit of man himself. Break his spirit with inhibitions of fear, of fear of self-expression of opinion, by speech, writing, invention, art, or any good and legitimate assertion of his genius, and you dry up the fountain source of the stream of progress. Fear, inhibiting fear, in large measure the outcome of the war, has become the chief enemy of modern civilization. Fear is never constructive nor creative. It is always destructive and cruel. It is the source of the political and social persecutions of our own day even as it was in the Middle Ages, when men feared for their religious opinions. Fear for national or racial survival, fear of the passing of the present status of society, fear of the loss of special privilege arms oppression with every cruelty and makes it indifferent to every claim of religion or of humanity.

Should mankind generally yield to this present temptation, we are doomed to a new world-wide slavery which will be more terrible than any the world has yet known because it will be slavery to an unthinking machine: the slavery indulged by a mechanized social order which will put a pause to scientific advance and land us in a social darkness from which scarcely a thousand years of human struggle can free us.

This deeper slavery is already begun in the factories of the Orient, where infants of five or six years work from dark till dark at the whirring spindle and sink exhausted upon the floor for their nightly rest. By comparison the slavery of the field which the past has known would be like the tender mercies of God.

V.

The Way Out

By this time some will be convinced that these Cassandra warnings are but the prediction of another "Twilight of the Gods," or at best but the repetition of Spengler's sad pessimism in "The Decline of the West." Is there any way out? In spite of the apparent pessimism so far, I am able to affirm that I do not despair for the future of human culture. There are already many forces at work to bring a better day for all humanity, but these forces are often hidden, they are not so much in the eyes of men but they are none the less powerful.

Yet when I affirm that the solution must come through a new spiritualization of society there will be many to whom the suggestion will seem born of feebleness and defeat. Nevertheless so wise a militarist or big navy man as Captain Mahan offers these comments in his work, *The Problem of Asia*:

Civilization in final analysis, means, not material development in the external environment, but the elevation of personal, and through personal, of national character. (p. 88).

And again:

If the advantage to us is great of a China open to commerce, the danger to us and to her is infinitely greater of a China enriched and strengthened by the material advantages we have to offer, but uncontrolled in the use of them by any clear understanding, much less any full acceptance, of the mental and moral forces which have generated, and in large measure govern, our political and social action. (pp. 166, 167).

Writing of that day when China shall have come to take her real place among the nations, he declares:

Those who live in that day will recognize then what our duty to them requires us to realize now—how immense the importance to the world that their development has been not merely material, but spiritual; that time shall have been secured for them to absorb the ideals which in ourselves are the result of centuries of Christian increment. (p. 93).

The conflict of present civilization, and the destiny of the future, lie between the spiritualizing and the mechanizing forces of the Western world. China is the buffer state in this conflict. For it is inconceivable that so large a land area, with a common language, and the vastest segregated population on the face of the globe, should be permanently dominated by any other power or powers separated by either long or short expanses of water. Her future will depend not more on her quick rise to military power than upon the wide working of the leaven of spiritual and moral principles both in her own system and in those that have been brought by the Western world and which are in process of being adopted. In these latter lie not only her own salvation but

likewise the salvation of the world to a higher civilization. Should she be overcome by a process of mere mechanization, she might easily become the prey of the exploiter, and the tool for the destruction of civilization; should she take on a new birth of freedom founded in sure principles of justice and moral order, of freedom and moral values, she will lead the world to a surer peace and a better civilization than it has yet known.

Within the keeping of China lies the welfare of the coming civilization. Who saves the soul of China will save the world!

*HAMLET CONTEMPLATES THE SKULL —
AND ENTERTAINS CERTAIN DOUBTS*

By ANGELO P. BERTOCCHI

This is the skull, this vacant gourd of bone
Is where it happened; and our wise men say
It all was mathematics, resume,
Economy in ciphers to be known
Sometime, a formula the same in stone,
Earth, plant or bug, in yonder mist-strewn Way
Spilled with new worlds, a formula today
Achieved: Behold the final skull foreshown!

Yet forms passed here and lore of gracious things,
Processional moons through stellar geography
Sky-flung; here names and numbers teemed
Pythagorean, larval reasonings
Spun subtle ladders toward Divinity—
Strange! So it was a skull for all it seemed?

NISHIDA, NOTABLE JAPANESE PERSONALIST

By RAYMOND FRANK PIPER

SOME months ago, I asked a Japanese friend, Masaru Otake, to obtain, from his philosophic friends in Japan, one or two significant recent books of Japanese philosophy. They carefully selected and sent *A Study of the Good*¹ by Ikutaro Nishida. The author has had a long and influential teaching career in Kanazawa Junior College and in Kyoto University. For several days I have been listening to my friend translate the chief parts of this work of more than three hundred pages. I had somewhat fearful expectations of encountering a medley of western thought and Oriental poetry. My fears proved altogether vain. My delight steadily mounted into enthusiasm as I beheld taking shape before me the original statement of a beautifully rounded system of philosophy. To gain compactness in the following summary, I have rearranged the author's ideas very much, but for the most part I have used his words, carefully translated. I have omitted personal comment so that the system may stand forth in its own high worth.

I.

The foundation of Nishida's metaphysics (Parts I and II) is the doctrine of pure or direct experience, conceived as concrete and personal, dynamic and universal. In the original fact of concrete experience there is no contrast between subject and object, spirit and body, internal and external; but matter is mind, and mind is matter; there is one reality. These contrasting terms appear only as differentiating thought develops a system of reality. For example,

¹ A 1931 reprint of the first edition of 1921, published by the Iwanami Shoten (Bookshop), Tokyo.

what the physicist calls pure matter, from which every personal element has been eliminated, is far removed from the concrete fact. The explanation of reality in terms of matter is very shallow and external. Fundamentally there cannot be two types of reality, spirit and matter; these are different viewpoints of one basic reality. Space, time, and physical energy are simply the general principles which the mind constructs in its effort to explain and control experience. Matter cannot exist independently of consciousness. Indeed, matter is one of the most highly abstract concepts of explanatory science. Pure experience is the only reality. (Nishida once read Mach, but declares that he was untouched by him.)

Now the order and activity of nature revealed in scientific research indicates that behind or within nature a controlling power operates. The world of nature is a system of consciousness ruled by a superindividuality; the phenomena of consciousness are founded upon the same power. This controlling power at work at the foundation of all things, both physical and spiritual, we call self or personality. The most fundamental explanation of the world inevitably comes back to self as ultimate rather than to matter. Even the knowledge of the most objective things cannot help being tinged with individual personality. The more one approaches the concrete and complete fact, the more personal it becomes. The most concrete fact is the most personal. That is why primitive explanation consists of personification, and why religion is the culmination of metaphysics. The secret of the explanation of the universe is selfhood. To explain spirit by matter is to reverse beginning and end, foundation and super-structure. The control of the natural world is a species of conscious control. Nature is grounded in cosmic consciousness.

Now this personal controlling power upon which the whole universe rests and which feeds the universe is none other than God. He is the origin, ground, and meaning of everything, of things as well as persons. There is nothing besides God and his manifestations; everything comes from him; in this sense he is completely free.

But God is not the transcendent creator of the universe; rather he is the immanent and eternal ground of reality. The relation between God and the world is far more integral than that between an artist and the work he fashions. The relation is more comparable to that of the body and its phenomenal activities, or to consciousness and such products as ideas or images. As hands and feet are to man, so men and things are to God. The universe in its totality is a manifestation of God. From the movements of sun and moon and stars outside to the intricacies of the human mind within we see only revelations of God.

The assertion that God is the controller of the world and that it is an expression of him is not a metaphor but a fact. This control is not merely an abstract idea by a concrete fact; it is like the vital, purposive spirit or will that controls our individual selves. As that spirit can be called personal, so God can be called personal. God alone is true reality, not in a strictly pantheistic sense, but as the ever-present controlling power. The universe is literally a personal expression of God. His power cannot be limited in a quantitative way; it is immeasurable and infinite.

II.

The ethics of Nishida (Part III) is a consistent outcome of his metaphysics and religion. As the controlling power of reality is best conceived as will, so the deepest fact in human consciousness, the primary function of mind, is will. Con-

consciousness could not exist without the dynamics and the conflicts of will. Will is described psychologically as conscious productive activity which directs ideas with reference to desires or purposes. Will begins with desire, struggles with dilemmas in deliberation, and issues in purposive decision.

Will can achieve control, however, only through the medium of bodily movements and the resulting changes in the physical world. As objective nature cannot exist isolated from subjective control, so the latter cannot be real control at all without a content which contrasts with itself. Both belong to the same reality; only the form of control differs in each; either taken by itself is a one-sided, abstract and imperfect reality. Reality can be concrete and perfect only in the union of the two. Concrete activity viewed externally is physical movement, viewed internally it is will.

The will of the individual operates under the conscious form of conceptual result or desire. Certain desires or demands exist as mental facts; for example, the appetite for food. They exist and we experience them whether or not we can find reasons for them. It is these desires which determine values. The good is that which satisfies some internal demand. There are no values apart from the demands of personality. Personality is the foundation of all values. Hence, in this universe only personality has absolute value.

Every person experiences a desire or demand that is more fundamental than all others, which are partial and subordinate. This central demand is to realize the controlling power of consciousness. It is the demand for the development of such a system of purposes and habits as will realize the self in a full and harmonious way. In other words, the ultimate goal to which all of man's activities reach out is the effective realization of personality. Such a

realization brings the utmost satisfaction to the individual. It is absolute good.

For the attainment of this highest good of self-realization several conditions are indispensable. One is absolute sincerity and honesty of purpose. This quality is necessary to save us from the painful restrictions of self-deception, selfishness, and isolation. The more selfish one is the more suffering he feels. A mind which has nothing to do with social consciousness could only be the mind of a madman. Pride, pleasure, and sensual enjoyments represent a false individualism. True individualism is quite the opposite; it is in fact one with cooperation. Here we meet a second prerequisite of self-realization.

Aristotle spoke an immutable truth when he asserted that man is a social animal. Many of the most indispensable instruments of self-realization are gifts of society, such as, language, custom, laws, science, literature, and taste. These supply food for the individual life. The most complete individuality develops through the most active and sympathetic cooperation with others. This kind of cooperation may be called love. Love means the intuition of the feelings of others. It is a seeking for completion in other personalities

III.

Nishida's doctrine of love in relation to knowledge (stated in an appended lecture) comes like a fresh breeze over the deserts of epistemology. It is a consistent expression of the highly refined aesthetic sense which prevails among the Japanese elite. He expounds his comprehensive view of love by comparing it with knowledge. Knowledge concerns impersonal objects, or persons regarded impersonally; whereas love is the knowledge of personal objects, or of impersonal things viewed in a personal way. In order to know

a thing, anything, we must love it; at the same time, to love a thing we must know it. Love and knowledge are mutually supporting; they are one spiritual process.

The objects of love are by no means limited to other persons. They in fact include the universe, oneself, one's neighbor, objective things, and God. Since the foundation of the universe is a divine personality, love is the sole way to reach the deepest comprehension of things as well as of persons. This basic reality cannot be reached by the impersonal and superficial methods of analysis and inference. Personality at the core of consciousness is beyond analysis. We can know God only by love. Love is the summit of knowledge, the royal road to reality.

Another condition of personal development now becomes evident. To realize oneself as a whole one must join his partial individual self to the infinite power which controls the universe. One must shift the center of his consciousness from private and selfish wishes to the greater life of the universe. Only by seeing oneself in one's social and cosmic setting can one free himself from the bondage of subjective demands, fancies, and deceptions. To know (love) reality is to know oneself; to know oneself is to know reality.

From this point of view good conduct can be called love in the broadest sense. The good man seeks to identify himself with the world. Thus love becomes an all-inclusive emotion, a comprehensive intuition, like the God-intoxicated spirit of Spinoza.

The goal of love is unification with the object of love. Loving a flower means fusing oneself with the flower. The more one loses his own self and reaches the objective world, the deeper becomes his love and the richer his personality. When, for example, we are intent on things we like, we are

almost unconscious, we forget ourselves, and only some mysterious power above us works magnificently. In this happy state of union, subject and object are obliterated; self and others are forgotten, rather, are blended into one. For example, when we feel the joy or sorrow of another as our own, and laugh or cry with him, we are at once loving and knowing him. Knowledge and love have become one. Such a harmonious union is the goal of perfect love. It is the fundamental desire of consciousness. It is the secret and end of morality, art, and religion.

IV.

Nishida's philosophy of religion is set forth in Part IV of his book. If one knows what his true self means, then not only will he identify himself with the good of humanity, but also he will join forces with the universe, as well as unite himself with the will of God. The deepest and greatest desire of the human mind is religious desire. Religion brings the peak of cooperative love. It is the desire to unite with the infinite loving personality which sustains the universe, and thus to achieve one's true and eternal self. The intimacy of this union is suggested in the words of St. Paul (*Galatians* 2:20) which the author quotes several times: "It is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me."

High achievement in religion requires an austere will and a deep spiritual conversion. The religious desire is the will to sacrifice the whole physical life on the cross in order to live in God alone (compare further, *Galatians* 2:2). It entails the immolation of a precious, but false, self in order to gain a new and greater personality. The following words of Jesus (*Matthew* 10:39) express the true nature of religion: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it."

Religion is mistakenly conceived as a quest for peace of mind, because this attitude kills the spirit of initiative, and produces a negative life. We should not seek religion for the sake of peace; but true peace comes as a result of religion, and of religion alone. That God loves man does not mean that he gives him nothing but happiness; it signifies that God allows man to return to him who is his home. Along the pathway of attainment man is likely to encounter many trials and sufferings. The function of prayer is not to ask help or profit for oneself, but to express appreciation and gratitude to God for the return of ourselves to him, who is the fountain of our life. We live only in God.

The man who really thinks and the man who sincerely wishes to live well cannot help feeling an ardent religious longing, because religion is the desire for life itself, for self-realization in the universe as constituted, for one's completest possible self. All other desires concern only a part of the self. Religion alone brings a satisfying solution to the whole self. Spiritual development consists in the enlargement of the self through loving coöperation with supreme cosmic personality.

A fundamental idea in religion is that God and man possess the same nature. This conception is the only true basis for religion. A radical distinction between the natures of man and God makes impossible a reasonable religion. Religious life consists in man's conscious return to his cognate Source by the way of loving coöperation.

God is the greatest and most vital of the controllers of our consciousness, nay our consciousness must be a part of the consciousness of God. In spiritual things each part stands under the control of the whole at the same time that it realizes a unique end in itself. I consider that my consciousness, in spite of the vicissitudes of daily experi-

ences, is one because it has the same control throughout; so our spirits must be one with or in God. Individual spirits cannot be distinguished in a merely physical or spatial way. The characteristic uniqueness of every individual lies in the unitary control he exercises and in the expression of that control in his peculiar personal manners of speech, facial expression, and gesture. Consciousness exists through control alone, and this control varies from the small control of individual human consciousness in every-day life up to the mighty control of cosmic consciousness which combines all human consciousness.

If God is the foundation of everything, including human consciousness, then what sense, if any, can be found in the idea of the freedom of the will? True freedom must be an expression or activity of oneself, the working out of one's inner and essential nature. However, in conflicting situations and in reflective consciousness, where possibilities of choice exist, a kind of selective freedom operates. As knowledge becomes more and more definite, the possibilities decrease. When we are thoroughly acquainted with a thing, there is no room for selective will. But knowing is not limited to reflection; intuition is also knowing; indeed, it is true knowledge when it partakes of the nature of love. It follows that God, who is all-knowing, has no indefinite will. He does not love one man and hate another, He does not prosper one man and destroy his neighbor. As we love our hands and feet, so God loves all things; His love is universal and eternal.

Human individuality is produced by differentiation (dividing and changing process) within primary reality. This process may be regarded as a part of the development of God. It does not make human individuality illusory, like the foam of ocean waves. Everyone is born with a spe-

cial message to the world and with a will of his own. The development of each individual contributes to completing the development of God.

The differentiation of finite individuals, however, inevitably brings in its train a measure of separation from God, conflict, suffering, evil. Evil is the necessary consequence of the differential process in reality. In this sense it is one of the constituent elements of the universe. Reality evolves through dilemmas and conflicts. Evil occurs whenever some partial aspect of reality comes into conflict with another part.

Man's experience of conflict and suffering produces in him a deep desire to raise his control to a higher level, which will bring closer union with God. In this desire lies man's opportunity for growth. Dissatisfaction and suffering, hatred, sin, and evil, are conditions of spiritual development. If these things were omitted from the world, we should lose not only the way of spiritual growth, but at the same time many beautiful spiritual enterprises would be lost. A world so peaceable as to lack all the challenge of evil would be a commonplace and superficial one. One who does not know sin cannot truly know the love of God. Christ taught that the sinner may repent and be changed, and how beautiful is the return of the prodigal! The religious man, therefore, does not condemn evils as contradictions of God, but thanks God for the benefactions of more abundant and far-reaching life which comes through overcoming the evils of life.

There is no absolute evil. Error, ugliness, sin, are only partial or transitory ways of looking at a whole. God has adorned the world, like a great poem, with the contrasts of shadows which increase the beauty of the picture when it is viewed as a whole. In evil there is no function of con-

trol, and no inner progress. It cannot create purpose out of itself. Carnal desire, for instance, is not an evil in itself; it becomes evil only when it obstructs spiritual development. Anything becomes evil during the time that it interferes with the realization of personality. Fundamentally, everything is good, good for the realization of personality.

THE CHRISTMAS TREE

By JOHN RICHARD MORELAND

Of all the brilliant Christmas trees,
The loveliest that I have seen
Was not within the sanctity
Of ancient church or home serene,
But just a cone-shaped tree of green,
Snow-touched, upon a lifted hill
When all the night was hushed and still.

There were no ornaments of glass
To scintillate with rainbow color,
No candles burning bright as brass,
No toys nor beads in red and yellow;
Orange or apple, ripe and mellow,
To make an artificial dress
Of irridescent loveliness.

But on this tree upon the height
Hung icicles pellucid, slim;
And all the green was powdered white
With snow, and tipping every limb
A star bent down to give it light
And show its glittering coat of mail
As lovely as a crystal grail.

I think it was a tree like this
That glistened on that Holy Morning
When Mary's lips first pressed a kiss
On Jesus' mouth; when Wise Men scorning
All earthly kings, brought gifts adorning
An humble shed and made it fair,—
And found the Infant Jesus there.

SOME REFLEXIONS ON CHINESE LANDSCAPE PAINTINGS

By GERALDINE CARR

SPENGLER has said, with regard to the morphology of art history, that the style of a period is not the direct result of the individuality or the personality of some great artist, but that it is the style or culture of a period that makes the artist produce a certain type of work; that in every historic period we find a definite style that marks that period and that is the style of the culture of that period. Art is only great art when it is producing an iconography for a living culture, it is only barren and sterile when imitating a dead culture.

According to Chinese estimation landscape is the highest kind of painting because it includes more forms of life than any other. In a landscape there are generally some figures, a fisherman in his boat beneath the willow that is beside the bridge; the sage in contemplation seated outside his retreat in the mountains where green boughs make a sheltering roof; friends who meet together to drink and listen to music or watch the steps of the dancing girl on her mat spread out on the grass, and beyond are the sheer mountains that rise precipitously and the high clouds that sweep around them and the white river that winds away to the lake below. There is a psychological affinity between the figures and the landscape; they are so interrelated that they seem to belong necessarily to one another; the landscape and the figures form an epitome of the universe, "a brief abstract", as it were, of the great world. You are made to feel the littleness of man, a mere speck in the great stage, the short span of his life in comparison with the immemorial pines, his frailty in face of the strength of the hills. The Chinese artist contemplates nature with wide

open eyes until his vision becomes an understanding of the energizing forces that permeate all things, and his own subjective reactions become impersonal and are subsumed in the expression of that which is all-pervading and universal. Throughout Chinese landscape are the ever-recurring motives of wind and water, the expression of "rhythmic vitality". As long ago as the fifth century of our era Hsieh Ho laid down the six canons of painting which have been ever since the recognized tests of Chinese art. The first and the most cogent of these rules has been translated by Mr. Okakura as "*the life-movement of the spirit through the rhythm of things.*" We may see this primary rule exemplified in the many legends told of the work of early painters, such as that of the artist commissioned to paint a dragon on the Temple wall and as he put the finishing touches to it the dragon received life and bursting from the wall soared upwards crashing through the ceiling. Right through the history of Chinese art, from very early times, there have been essays on Painting from which we may learn that it was never considered necessary for the artist to approach his subject from an original point of view, that the subject and the manner of painting were traditional, and that for long ages the same subject was painted over and over again in much the same way. It is through the very limitations that Chinese art has submitted to, hedged in and circumscribed by tradition, that it has gained its peculiar force and poignancy. These Essays discuss what are the main themes that should be included in a landscape composition, and how and in what manner these should be expressed: the main mountain peak must be high and lofty, the smaller should stretch down to where the hermit's hut rests on the sheltered ledge; some dwellings are on the banks of the river and around the village a grove of trees; the side of the mountain must be steep as a precipice, the far summit

reaching to the clouds; strangely twisted trees overhang the steep cliffs; the torrent rushes down through the bridges to the quiet water where the fishermen lie in their boats. In these descriptions are the traditional themes of a multitude of pictures none of which are alike in detail but all of which have general characteristics. The painter and art critic, Kuo Hsi (B.C. 1020), writes:

Noise, dirt, bridles and chains, these are what man's nature is ever weary of. Haze and mist, saints and fairies, for these man's nature pines eternally. Now comes the painter and by his skill all these things are suddenly brought to us (quoted by Arthur Waley).

Painting is a very old art in China and closely associated with the art of writing, both use the same brush and the same ink, both learn the technique of expressiveness through copying repeatedly models of the best work. There are great differences between the paintings of one period and another but there are greater similarities. Painters of the Ming and Ching dynasties follow the theories and precepts formulated centuries earlier and produce pictures that in essentials are the same as those of the T'ang and Sung dynasties. "My master," says Toa-chi in the seventeenth century, "*was my own way*, but there is only one way, and what I call *my own way* was really the way of the ancients."

Chinese landscape painting during a long period of time, from the T'ang to the Ching, gave expression to the culture of a civilization that changed but little, it was a vital culture reflecting a national philosophy and its art a great art because expressive of that culture.

Now to turn to a very different art, the classic landscape art of France, and especially to the art of Nicolas Poussin (1594-1665). This too is a living and a vital art. Renaissance culture had passed from Italy to France in the six-

teenth and seventeenth centuries. The French, being a Latin people, had awakened to the fact that they, like the Italians, had a heritage in the culture of ancient Rome, and thus it was that France fell into the age of reason. Descartes, the philosopher of that time, was seeking for comprehensible principles out of which all visible phenomena could be originated, and Colbert, who was Administrator of the Public Finance, following Descartes' lead, looked for the comprehensible principles out of which a state could be originated. Colbert, like Descartes, is in love with geometry, he sees nothing but straight lines, rivers joined to rivers by the straight lines of canals, forests cut through by straight roads, and soldiers dressed in uniform. It is in this culture that Poussin, one of the greatest of French artists, grew up to manhood, and it is Poussin who will give expression to the thought of this age in paintings in which he marshals his materials in accord with the eternal verities, the "music of the spheres", the structure of the universe, architectonic form. Poussin will create an iconography expressive of the culture of his time, the symbolic equivalent of some aspect of life as he knows it. Thus in a measure the art of Poussin is in accord with that of the Classic landscape art of China yet the method is entirely different. The Chinese interest is in the rhythm of life, the French is towards structure and mechanism. Poussin does not, as the Chinese painter does, imagine himself into the life of the object he is depicting; his is an entirely objective approach. He contemplates and studies nature, but when he goes home he takes out a box and some little cardboard figures and with sprigs of greenery and moss and stones he establishes his composition.

In making a comparison between these two very different, and great, classic landscape arts I want to point out an apparent paradox which concerns the method more

than the subject matter. In regard to the fundamental principles involved in both these arts, in the one case "rhythmic vitality" in the other "structure", we are concerned with subject matter alone, and looked at from this angle the "spirit" that marks Chinese Art seems to connote greater freedom than the "structure" of Poussin's art. But when we consider the method we may see that the French artist is freer to manipulate his material according to his own fantasy than the Chinese artist. Poussin, with his idea of "judgment in all things" as his guide, imposes his will on material, he orders nature, he *creates*, he elaborates and embroiders to his heart's content, balancing one part against another. Nature unorganized and uncontrolled by the hand of man was not the theme of European art in any one of its forms before the Romantic period of the eighteenth century. Nature is the material to be used; its expression is in terms of law, order, proportion, harmony. Poussin had at his command the language of art; he knew it as a poet knows the magic ring and music of words. The Chinese painter, on the other hand, is far more spontaneous; his work presents us with intuitions, intimations of the spirit of things, though he too, has thoroughly mastered the language of art, but when, after intense concentration, the passion of creation comes to him, he will with rapid calligraphic brush-strokes, that fall as it were from the tip of his brush, produce a fantasy that is a translation or a translucence, a lyrical outburst, a response as natural as the song of a bird, but that in effect is a composed response, though composed as by a kind of felicity rather than by a conscious integrating of part with part. What the comparison really amounts to is that Poussin gives us the rhythm of pattern, the Sung artist the rhythm of life. One might be compared to a Bach fugue, the other to a free fantasia.

THE PERSONAL BASIS OF INDIAN THOUGHT

By H. JEFFERY SMITH

ONE of the commonest generalizations regarding the main tendency of Indian thought is that its highest conceptions are impersonal. Such a generalization is true, however, only when the term "impersonal" is used in a shallow and misleading sense. For whereas the classical and modern philosophy of the West has been dominated in large measure by the ideals and conceptions of science, and has for that reason tended to abstract from the whole of personal experience, the philosophy of India is almost wholly grounded on the conception of the self.

Before developing this view it may be well to consider the sense in which the term "impersonal" is commonly applied to Indian thought. One illustration may perhaps suffice. In his authoritative lecture on *Indian Conceptions of Immortality*, Professor Walter Eugene Clark, commenting on the non-theistic character of the Brahman conception of Reality, writes:

Personal gods are admitted, but as in Epicurus are only at a stage higher than man, are not final. The ultimate reality is impersonal and incomprehensible. Theism is valid for the less intelligent lower classes as a partial answer to the riddle of the universe, but personal gods, like men, are mortal.¹

From this passage it is clear that the quality of personality is identified with particular or finite personality, the possibility of an infinite or universal personality being tacitly denied. Thus it is possible to describe the limited character of the gods by describing them as personal, and the unlimited character of the universe by describing it as impersonal.

¹ Walter E. Clark, *Indian Conceptions of Immortality*, Harvard University Press, 1934. P. 14.

Such a use of terms, however, rests on the failure to recognize fully the supreme contribution of India to philosophy, namely the concept of the person, self or *atman* as an entity which in its essence is universal and is therefore identical with the *Atman* which is *Brahma*. Thus the supreme experience of the Brahman is the realization of the identity of his own *atman* with *Brahma*, this realization being expressed in the phrase, "*Tat tvam asi*," "That art thou."

The philosophy of Epicurus, to the extent that it remains true to the atomistic metaphysics on which he based it, is utterly materialistic. The human and divine personalities of his system are temporary patterns which dissolve in time, and are in reality nothing but atoms in the void, the atoms being made of impenetrable matter and really differing only in their spatio-temporal relations. Quite different from this would-be reduction of personality to material terms is the elevation of personality to the position of a universal, and in the most characteristic of Indian philosophies, the *Vedanta*, to the position of the Supreme Universal. For the Brahman identification of the apparently finite self with the universal self constitutes not the dissolution but the realization of the true self. Professor Clark is right when he says that for the Brahman "ultimate reality lies beyond the domain of personal gods," where "personal" implies "finite," and it is equally true that "the saint who is destined to immortality passes beyond the sight and ken of men and gods."¹ But in this transfiguration of the apparently finite self into *Brahma* the essence of personality or selfhood is not annihilated but is caught up into its universal being, which though it certainly transcends the finite, and may even be said to transcend the personal itself, cannot therefore be said to be impersonal. In the last analy-

¹ Op. Cit. p. 15.

sis Brahma does transcend the personal, and this has been the ground for the common supposition that the ultimate attitude of the Indian philosopher is one of scepticism. But the essence of transcendence in contrast to reduction is that the object transcended is included and remains immanent in the transcendent. Only through such a conception can the notion of a related hierarchy, or of a plural continuum be maintained. The alternative is unrelatedness and dissolution.

It is well at this point to turn to more practical considerations regarding the use of terms. For with reason it may be held that Professor Clark in the passage quoted is simply using the terms "personal" and "impersonal" in their generally accepted sense. Exactly what the accepted sense is may be difficult, however, to determine. At times the most ordinary usage of the term "personal" seems to suggest something peculiarly intimate and spiritual as distinct from material, an inner quality in contrast to an external form. In this sense it suggests neither the limitations of subjectivism, nor the finitude of isolation, for in such contexts the inwardness of personal experience is thought of as both profound and penetrative of the objective world. To "talk personalities," to use a crude example, is to let one's tongue pry into the inner recesses of other people (usually not present); to "have personality" is to exhibit a quality enabling one to express one's inner nature most freely and most presentably to the objective social world. Having said this, it must also be admitted that there is a common usage whereby "personal" does suggest a negative subjectivism and of the term "impersonal" which suggests the unlimited spaciousness most obviously revealed in the external world. This usage, however, with its bias against the potential universality of personality, is not adapted to the clear discussion of Indian thought, and should be avoided.

While dealing with terms a word may be said regarding the interchangeable use of "personality," "spirit," "soul," "self" and "*atman*." There have been and still persist peculiar connotations, convenient for purposes of emphasis, by reason of which these terms have been falsely supposed to be essentially distinguished. Mind, thought of as a peculiarly intellectual activity or as a substantial entity has thus been distinguished from the supposedly more spiritual and insubstantial soul. Spirit similarly has suggested a more pervasive being than the self, which has at times suggested individuality. Today in philosophic circles these distinctions are no longer accepted as fundamental, and in like manner an ultimate distinction between them and personality has been rendered obsolete. There was a time, however when the concept of mind was in danger of being submerged in an abstract rationalism, having little relation to the peculiarly vital character of conscious life. At this time the term personality was introduced to emphasize the conscious concrete, spiritual character of mind. Today this emphasis has in large measure been accepted, and personality with its specific connotations is taken as fundamentally the same as mind. In this paper, however, this term is stressed just because there is a tendency not only among commentators, but in Indian thought itself in the very moment of its highest realization of the personal, to faint with Brahma-intoxication and to fall back into the formalism and materialism which it seeks above all to escape.

In this brief essay little can be said regarding the historical development which led to the formulation of what is generally recognized as the highest and most characteristic concept of Indian thought, the concept of Brahma. Nor is possible to dwell on its practical and religious value. All that can here be attempted is a restatement of the concept

as it was ultimately formulated, in the simplest and most formal western terms.

The idea of Brahma arises from the observation that beneath the variety and complexity of nature there is apparently some hidden unity. What is the nature of this unity? It cannot be described in terms of any one object in nature, for that would be to reduce the whole to one of its parts instead of explaining the parts in relation to the whole. The unity which apparently makes the world a universe must therefore be conceived as something which includes its parts but is unlimited by any of them. Various phenomena suggest this character and may therefore be taken as being in some degree models of the universe. Space, for example, includes all physical things and yet is enclosed by none of them. The self or mind is another and indeed a more inclusive unity, for the mind not only observes objects in space, and conceives infinite space, but it can also comprehend entities which infinite space itself cannot fully encompass. Thus mind can comprehend supra-spatial entities, such as the feeling of joy and the idea of triangularity, which though they are to some extent embodied in space are not bounded by it. Thus space, though spatially infinite is finite in relation to mind which limits and transcends it.

What has been said of physical objects and spatial forms can be said of all objects however subjective, such as feelings and ideas. For these too are objects of mind and not mind or personality itself. Hence the Brahman's scepticism of philosophy and indeed of all the formal ideals which in the western scientific tradition have too often been mistaken at times for mind and at times for absolute reality itself. But this scepticism of forms, like the Brahman's scepticism of the material, is not merely negative but arises

from a realization of the higher concept of self or mind. Hence the Brahman does not share Plato's essentially scientific identification of reality with form; but on the other hand neither does he share the tendency of western romanticism to identify it with some less rigid but still limited experience such as feeling or change. For the Brahman the highest wisdom is neither philosophy nor logic, as it is for Croce and Hegel, nor the aesthetic expression of feeling. Rather it is the awareness of awareness itself. Thus Brahman philosophy stands in close sympathy to the "Know Thyself" of Socrates as distinct from his (or Plato's) elevation of dialectic to supremacy, and to Descartes' "I think, therefore I am," as distinct from Cartesian mechanism.

The identification of the self with Brahma comes through no stretching of the finite self to fit the infinite, but through the realization that the self is not and never has been merely finite, and that the boundless unity which is its essence is indistinguishable from the boundless unity which is the universe. This realization though aided by will and intellect rests ultimately on the still small voice of self-awareness. Schopenhauer, struggling with the paradox of a wilful absolute seems to have realized this when he turned to Indian philosophy for a personal peace which no struggle could alone achieve. Faust too seems to have realized it when he abandoned his ideal of grasping all knowledge in a single moment for the simpler realization that in ordinary life the self is already at one with the infinite. So Buddha found the Nirvana of self-realization in turning from his lacerations of flesh and spirit to meditation beneath a *bo* tree. Only the failure to realize the personal nature of these enlightenments can lead to the commonplace opinion that the life of meditation, in which in the moment of highest realization, body, will and intellect are subdued,

consists in nothing whatsoever and is emptier even than a vacuum.

The pantheism of Brahman thought has sometimes been treated as inconsistent with its personalism. But this is true only of pantheism in its materialistic degeneration. Essentially the pantheistic conception arises from the consciousness of self and universe as utterly boundless in essence. Just as Pascal insisted that the infinity of the universe is microscopic as well as macroscopic, so the Brahman holds that the self or Brahma must not only be externally unbounded, but unbounded even by its parts. Were the commonest stone to exist in any way apart from the essence of Brahma, the universe would not comprehend its parts through and through. Therefore the Brahman is forced by the nature of his conception of the self as universal to hold that any object whatsoever not only participates in Brahma but in some ways reveals and is its very essence.

This means that logically the Brahman can say of anything whatsoever and without necessarily making any qualification, "This is Brahma." This statement applied to material things is difficult for the Westerner with his tendency towards absolute dualism to accept. Yet to some extent this view is implied in the attitude of the modern experimental scientist, as distinct from the more formal observational science of the Greeks. For experimental method depends on a respect for apparently in significant individuals by reason of the belief that in their intrinsic nature may be found the presence of universal law. Santayana somewhere remarks that man's highest achievement consists in his humility before the least promising objects of the material world. But such humility has meaning only insofar as man is not deluded in his belief that even the

least sparrow does not fall to the ground without the spirit of the whole being intrinsic to the occasion. In more human terms the inability of matter and sensation to stop the course of mind is revealed in Jesus' discovery of the goodness of publicans and sinners and of the unlimited potentialities of the common man. Even the somewhat specious transfiguration in modern fiction of harlot into heroine had its unconscious origin in the conception of the soul as infinite and indestructible. It is not easy to realize in a fully personal way the presence of a universal spirit, not only in the lilies of the field but in sticks and stones as well. But to the extent that the pantheist succeeds, the familiar words from a not altogether different context may be applied to him, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these, ye have done it unto me."

The difficulty of realizing the pantheistic ideal has often resulted in a slipping from the worship of the Brahma in things to a worship merely of things. Similarly the Indian philosopher's pragmatic tolerance for the common man's dependence on material symbols has tended to collapse into an attitude of indifference. It is at this point that India may well gain something from the West. For in the West the spirit of man has been active in his courting of Nature. With hand and brain and in a spirit of faith he has sought persistently to discover her secrets. Too often he has confused mere activity with discovery, but on the whole he has looked on Nature as a kindred spirit responsive to his mind. Where the Indian has taken a passive attitude towards physical conditions, the Westerner through positive action has discovered spiritual qualities in matter and circumstance which a passive indifference could neither discover nor create.

Buddha realized the materialistic tendency of panthe-

ism, but instead of attempting to overcome it through the development of man's creative power, he deliberately cultivated a deep indifference towards it. Hence his world is a dualism of matter and spirit, in which spirit must become utterly indifferent to matter. Fundamentally, Buddha follows the Brahman in his placing of supreme value upon the self, but he cannot quite go the whole way with the Brahman and accept the personal character of the world of sense. All that man need realize is the absolute and perfect nature of the self. To seek for anything higher by turning to the world of things is to confuse the mind with the material body and its desires, which may be real in themselves but as far as man is concerned are *maya*, illusion. This illusion he need only recognize for what it is and it will no longer enchant his mind. The self will then realize its natural state of Nirvana. This state is empty in relation to material things, and is selfless in that it is indifferent to the finite "self". But in relation to the true self it is full to overflowing, constituting the unbounded realization of the self whose essence it is. How far this is an accurate statement of the Buddha's own thought is of course speculative, but in the light of his Brahman heritage it would seem to be justified.

The personal character of Nirvana, however, has not generally been recognized by Western critics. Professor A. N. Whitehead, for example, describes Buddhism as primarily a metaphysic in contrast to Christianity which is primarily a religion. In *Religion in the Making* he writes:

Buddhism is the most colossal example in history of applied metaphysics.

Christianity took the opposite road. It has always been a religion seeking a metaphysic, in contrast to Buddhism which is a metaphysic generating a religion. (P. 50).

Buddhism makes itself probable by referring to its metaphysical theory. Christianity makes itself probable by referring to supreme religious moments in history. (P. 52).

From these quotations it is clear that for Whitehead religion is in some special sense a personal experience, whereas metaphysics is presumably more abstract. To this there is no objection. But Whitehead assumes that Buddhism rests primarily on metaphysics, whereas in truth as a metaphysical theory it is generated from an experience of Nirvana which is in essence personal and can only receive inadequate support from relatively impersonal metaphysical speculation. It is not possible to pin Whitehead down to any simple view, but it would seem that here he has misconstrued the essential nature of Buddhism by tacitly assuming that personal experience is essentially finite, and that universal experience is essentially an impersonal abstraction from immediate personal experience and is therefore metaphysical rather than religious.

In accordance with the pantheist principle it is permissible for the Brahman to say of anything that "This is Brahma." But this is only one side of the picture. For besides each object being in essence infinite, each is also finite. To emphasize this fact, the Brahman may also say of anything and without any necessary qualification, "This is not Brahma." Had Buddha and the Samkhya philosophers recognized this as a possible correction to the materialistic error of pantheism their reforms might have been different. But it is hard to expect everyone to accept the Brahman claim that it is possible to say both truly and falsely and without qualification of anything whatsoever that "This is Brahma" and "This is not Brahma." At first sight such a statement appears pure nonsense. Certainly it is formally self-contradictory. But if the authority of a Western math-

ematician and philosopher will induce patience a similar view may be found in Leibniz' conception of an original state of compossibility. But a much more common sense comparison may be made. For the scientist in recent years has familiarized us with the possibility of holding at one and the same time, though in different contexts, views which as they stand are formally self-contradictory, such as the wave and corpuscular theories of light. He is apt, however, to minimize this power by holding it to be a mere convenience, whereas for the Brahman philosopher it is the ultimate revelation of the nature of Brahma itself. That it is the ultimate qualification of Brahma few critics will deny, but does this not mean a scepticism rather than a personalism in the end? No, it does not. For, convenience or not, the possibility of holding contradictory propositions together, the possibility of supposing something to be true and at the same time knowing that it is not true, the possibility of saying "This is identical with that," can only be explained by the presence of a power higher than logical form, in this case mind or personality. Thus the very logical contradictions to which the Brahman must resort mean scepticism only to him who is unaware of the personal being, who is able to change his mind, to appear now in this form and now in that, and to remain at the same time a single, complex whole.

In the end, however, Brahman logic can be made to contradict the personal interpretation of Brahma. For it is equally possible to say that "Brahma is material." What can be made of this? What can be said is that in spite of these formal contradictions, it remains equally true that Brahma is personal, though he transcends the personal and is beyond all comprehension. At least we can say that whatever Brahma is like he is of such a nature as to have made us what we are. As far as we are concerned, therefore, he is best conceived as personal.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IN SOVIET RUSSIA

By N. LOSSKY

IN Soviet Russia the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels is a compulsory philosophical theory. Until 1925 many Soviet philosophers and, in particular, naturalists had emphasized their adherence to Marxism, but they made no clear distinction between dialectical and mechanical materialism. In 1925 Engels' *Dialectic of Nature*, written in 1873-82, was published for the first time, and resulted in a sharp division of the Soviet Marxists into "Dialecticians" and "Mechanists." A fanatical struggle now began "on two fronts" against "Menshevistic Idealism" and "Mechanical Materialism," and the chief outlines of Dialectical Materialism became clear.

The essence of Dialectical Materialism is seen when compared with Mechanical Materialism. But I shall first try to give an exact definition of the term materialism: materialism is a theory according to which the *ultimate* reality is matter, and mental processes, if they exist at all, are *passively* derived from material processes, i.e. they do not causally influence material processes. By the word "matter" is understood impenetrable substances moving in space. The classical form of Mechanical Materialism completely corresponds to my definition. Matter, according to this view, is an impenetrable mass moving in space whose fundamental properties are extension, impenetrability, and motion. Every change is spatial. The speed and direction of a moving particle can change only under the influence of a push or pressure from another particle. All other properties of an elementary particle of matter are unchangeable.

The laws applying to change caused by pushes and pressures are studied by Mechanics. Therefore every process taking place in the world is completely determined by mechanical laws. This theory reduces *qualitative* differences to *quantitative* ones. Therefore Mechanical Materialism does not admit purposive activity in the world; the structure of the world and all the changes in it are devoid of sense and have no objective value.

It is impossible to imagine any creative activity producing entirely new contents of existence in a world consisting of unchangeable elements devoid of any purposive and spiritual aspect. Mechanical Materialism therefore consistently asserts that all stages of existence higher than inorganic processes differ only in the complexity of their mechanical processes.

Let us now consider the definition of *Dialectical Materialism* and its theory of matter. From the epistemological standpoint advocates of this view claim that matter is "that which causes sensations in our sense organs; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensations." This definition contains only the acknowledgment of objective reality i.e. of the existence of matter "independent of our consciousness," but its properties are not explained. We expect the definition of matter from the point of view of Physics to satisfy our curiosity. But no! They say that it is impossible to define matter by genus and individual differences because "matter is all that exists and there is no more general notion under which it could be subsumed."

Thus the dialectical materialists have greatly simplified their task of founding a materialistic world-concept.

¹ Lenin, V.X, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, p. 117.

² Ibid, p. 118.

They affirm, without giving any proofs: "Matter is all that exists;" being is necessarily a "*material* category." After this, satisfying all the requests of present-day science and philosophy, they can ascribe to "being" most varied manifestations, qualities and faculties, very far from material character, and yet call their theory materialism, referring to their assertion that "matter is all that exists."

Firstly the dialectical materialists deny the existence of identical, unchangeable, small particles of matter and do not allow the reduction of qualitative differences to quantitative ones: matter is constantly changeable; quantity and quality cannot exist independently. Quantitative changes, when they reach a certain point, produce a sudden change in quality, and *vice versa* (the law established by Hegel).

The changeability of all that exists is conditioned by the two laws also established by Hegel, which form the basis of his doctrine of the dialectical process: the law of the interpenetration of opposites and the law of negation of negation.* "The world is the unity bifurcated in itself, the unity of the opposites, the container of contradictions," says Byhovsky.†

The profound difference between Dialectical and Mechanical Materialism is thus revealed. A materialist-mechanist recognizes only the external contradictions between a thing and the medium which it encounters; and therefore affirms that motion can take place only under the influence of an *external* cause, that is, an impact. On the other hand a "dialectician" finds inner contradictions in every subject, as the force producing development; therefore he regards the development of an object as its *self-movement*. A me-

* Deborin, *Introduction to the Translation of Hegel's Works*, p. XLI.

† Engels, *Dialectic of Nature*, p. 157.

* *Outline of the Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism*, p. 213.

chanist acknowledges the traditional logic and the law of contradiction, whereas a "dialectician" affirms, with Hegel, that every living being contains an embodied contradiction.

According to Lenin dialectical development has a creative character; it is an immanent "spontaneous" self-movement, containing "inner impulses." Therefore a transition from one stage of existence to another can be considered not only as a fact, but also as a value: development is the ascension to the more "valuable" stages of existence. In consequence of the creative character of development, the higher stages of existence are qualitatively different from the lower ones; therefore they cannot be understood as the aggregates of simple elements and processes. This thought is especially emphasized in modern Dialectical Materialism and distinguishes it sharply from Mechanical Materialism. "To reduce all types of lawfulness to mechanical lawfulness," says Byhovsky, "is to renounce the understanding of complicated being." Everything is subject to the laws of mechanics, but not to its laws alone. Every stage is subject to its special laws.⁷ These doctrines of Dialectical Materialism resemble the modern theory of emergent evolution.

The problem of consciousness and mental processes has always been the stumbling block of materialism, which is unable to afford a satisfactory solution of it. Thus Lenin writes:

Sensation, thought, consciousness is the highest product of matter organized in a special way.⁸
The Sensations are excited by the action of moving matter in our sense-organs.⁹

From this it seems that Lenin follows the mechanist doc-

⁶ See articles "Karl Marx" and "On the Problem of the Dialectic."

⁷ Byhovsky, *Outline of the Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 202-4.

⁸ Lenin, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, p. 39.

⁹ Op. Cit., p. 234.

trine according to which sensations, and mental states generally, are causally conditioned by the motory mechanical processes which take place in the sense organs and in the brain tissue.¹⁰ This teaching was always considered a doubtful statement of materialism. The "dialecticians" however, understand this and reject it, but they give no definite solution to this problem. Lenin says that the true opinion of materialists

is not in the deduction of sensation from the motion of matter, or in its reduction to this motion, but in the acknowledgment of sensation as one of the properties of moving matter.¹¹

Subsequently, if we are to be logically consistent, it is necessary to affirm that a sensation or a simpler inner process analogous to the psychoid state is as fundamental a property of matter as is motion. Precisely this thought we find in Lenin:

Materialism, consistent with Natural Science, takes matter as the primary, and consciousness, thought, and sensation as the secondary data, since sensation is linked up in a clearly expressed manner with the highest forms of matter (organic matter).¹²

We can only suppose, he suggests, that "at the basis of matter" is a faculty *similar* to sensation. He refers in this contention to Haeckel, Lloyd Morgan, and Diderot. Following this thought of Lenin the "dialecticians" at the same time oppose the views of the Marxist Plehanov, who adheres to the hylozoistic doctrine of the general animation of matter; nevertheless they do not try to show the difference between Plehanov's teaching and Lenin's doctrine that even unorganized matter has inner states analogous to sensations.¹³ Byhovsky says that

¹⁰ Op. Cit., p. 38, etc.

¹¹ Op. Cit., p. 32.

¹² Op. Cit., p. 30.

¹³ Byhovsky, *Outline of the Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism*, p. 83 et seq.

Consciousness is a property of highly organized matter on a very high level of evolution. . . . Consciousness makes matter, so to speak, two-sided: the objective physiological processes are accompanied by subjectivity, their inner reflection . . . What kind of connection is there between consciousness and matter? Is it possible to say that consciousness is dependent on material processes?

To this he answers in the negative: "a material change causes nothing save another material change." He tries to escape the difficulty thus:

The same process, which is physical from the outward objective side, is perceived by the material existence itself as a phenomenon of will, sensation, as something spiritual.

Further he adds: "this faculty, consciousness, is conditioned by the physical organization, like all other properties."¹³ This addition contradicts his statement that "a material change causes nothing save another material change." Evidently Byhovsky is approaching psychophysical parallelism, but he does not dare acknowledge it, for then he would have no right to call his world-conception materialism.

Also in the question of the *passiveness* of mental processes the Soviet "dialecticians" have forsaken the doctrines of classical materialism and even of orthodox Marxism. Marx affirmed that "consciousness does not determine existence, but existence determines consciousness" and consequently the Marxists have defended the theory that all the phenomena of spiritual life, such as religion and law, are merely a passive superstructure on social, material, productive relationships (historical and economic materialism). Now the Soviet "dialecticians" assert that political structure, law, philosophy, art, and all ideological developments "are based on economics, but each exercise an

influence on the others and on the economic basis.”¹⁴ It is remarkable that on the same page he repeats the old formula, “consciousness does not determine existence etc.,” and does not notice that he himself is contradicting it. This is small wonder: he wishes to be a materialist, but materialism, in the exact meaning of the word, is lost when it is acknowledged that mental processes can *actively* influence material ones.

Generally speaking, the dialectical materialists give no *logical* proof of materialism. At the basis of their doctrine lies an arbitrary assertion: matter is everything that exists. In fact, developing their theory, they endow existence with such properties as

the faculty of *immanent, spontaneous* development which is realized in a definite direction and which produces the progressively more valuable stages of existence, subordinate to laws, which cannot be reduced to laws of previous lower stages of existence.

Berdyaeff is right when he says that the dialectical materialism of the Marx-Leninists “endows matter with divine properties.” One fails to comprehend why they call such a fundamental existence by the word matter.

The Marxists, who are not materialists in reality, give their world-conception an appearance of materialism by means of vagueness and inexactness. The word *movement* renders them no small help: they signify by it not only the change of place in space, but also any change, even the creative acts which produce new qualities.

The most characteristic thesis of Dialectical Materialism, Hegel’s doctrine of the identity of opposites, is also logically inconsistent. Their examples such as the processes caused by positive and negative electricity, or matter as

¹⁴ E. G. Pozner, *Dialectical Materialism—The Philosophy of the Proletariat*, p. 68.

consisting of protons and electrons, demonstrate only the indissoluble unity of opposites, and not their identity, which would abolish the law of contradiction.

The tendency of Dialectical Materialism to free itself from the poverty of Mechanical Materialism and to discover the rich contents of every phenomenon is laudable. But the dialectic, which compels complexity, and the materialism, which leads to one-sidedness, are as incompatible as oil and water. The fear of losing materialism compels them to adhere to dogmas which inevitably impoverish the world: *monism*; the conception of all being as spatio-temporal; *sensualism*; *passivity* of consciousness; and *determinism*.

Materialism is evidently an inconsistent and superficial philosophical theory; therefore the tenacity with which the Russian Bolsheviks adhere to it and the fanatical intolerance displayed by them in defending it, can be explained only by deep psycho-logical motives and passions which hold them captive.

²⁵ For a detailed exposition and criticism of dialectical materialism see my brochure "Dialectical Materialism in USSR" in Russian—YMCA Press, Paris 1934; English translation in preparation.

MUST PRAGMATISTS DISAGREE?

By F. C. S. SCHILLER

GRANTING that the various brands of philosophers do, and must, disagree, how far must such disagreement go among philosophers who have consented to wear the same labels? Professor C. W. Morris's extended review of my *Must Philosophers Disagree?* in the last *Personalist* seems to raise this question, and affords me a welcome opportunity to discuss what must, to outside observers at least, seem very marked divergences between the pragmatists who drew their inspiration from William James and those who obtained their training in the Chicago School headed by Dewey. For some reason, not easily apparent, the latter often seem anxious to differentiate themselves from the former. But they never seem able to explain what precisely are their grounds for dissent: they content themselves with rehearsing a few rather obvious platitudes and ancient *clichés*, the application of which to the objects of their criticism is never specified. Strangely enough their attitude does not seem to be reciprocated by the former. These gulp down every extension or new application of pragmatic principles made by Professor Dewey, with relish and without a qualm and appear to be merely puzzled why a line between the sheep and the goats should be drawn right through what appears to them to be essentially the same body of doctrines.

It is upon this paradoxical situation that, with the help of Professor Morris's review, I hope to throw a little light, for in it what I cannot but call the grievances nourished by the Chicagoans against the Jacobeans (or Jacobins?) come out much more clearly than is usually the case.

1. To begin with, there is a reiteration that "Chicago has stressed the social element in experience, meaning and

knowledge," and a profession of exclusive "devotion to the concept of the social;" but I find it difficult to attach to this the enormous importance claimed for it. I cannot accept it as a differentia among pragmatists, because ever since Aristotle declared that man was a social animal it has been the merest commonplace, shared by practically all philosophers. But after some two thousand years of philosophic endorsement, is it not time that philosophers got busy and set about showing *how, precisely*, man's social nature reveals itself in human activities and affects his thinking and his knowing in *concrete detail*? Moreover is not this just what every form of pragmatism may be said to have attempted ever since it was hatched? Has it not proclaimed that "truth" always emerges from a social context and is relative to social uses? Has it not shown also how these apparent drawbacks might be turned to cognitive advantage?

I myself have always felt particularly innocent where wild charges of ignoring society were flung about. For though I had never shut my eyes to the undesirable effects on human truth-seeking which social intolerance and stupidity so frequently have—effects which in the present vogue of dictatorships should hardly need emphasizing—I had pointed out from the outset¹ how important was the difference between a truth-claim and a fully authenticated truth and how necessary was social approval to develop the one into the other. It is apparently the implications of this distinction between truth-claim and truth which so many of the Chicagoans have either not observed or not understood: this failure has led them to imagine that I had denied the social environment of truth-seeking. Moreover I had

¹ Cf. *Humanism*, 1903, p. 58 "man is a social being and truth indubitably is to a large extent a social product. . . . Truth has to win social recognition, to transform itself into a common property"—p. 59. "Social usefulness is an ultimate determinant of 'truth'." See also p. 55 for the way in which personal truth-claims acquire social currency, and *Studies in Humanism* (1907) Ch. vii.

adopted with alacrity Carveth Read's charming wolf-ape theory of the genesis of social co-operation, just because it seemed to fill in the vagueness of Aristotle's "devotion to the concept of society" and to suggest how man's nature had grown social. For it is clearly to anthropology rather than to metaphysics that an empiricist should look for light upon such matters. So I feel entitled simply to dismiss this count of the indictment, or at least to demand chapter and verse in support of it.

2. At any rate the social nature of knowing is so obviously a commonplace to be taken for granted by any pragmatist that the charge of denying it could not possibly be important if it were not made the basis for a further charge of taking meaning as a wholly private affair and overlooking its social aspects. I should admit that the question of meaning would provide a more substantial grievance if it were true (as Professor Morris assumes²) that personal meaning is exclusive of social.

But a moment's reflexion should convince even the naïv-est that such an assumption is absurd. For no one wishes to keep his meaning to himself: all crave to communicate it to others, if they can. Only the critical pragmatist has observed also that this is by no means an easy matter: he has been convinced by long and painful experience that communication of meaning is one of the major problems of philosophy, which has been woefully neglected ever since Gorgias despaired of it two thousand four hundred years ago. He is not content therefore to be told that "meanings are in intent intersubjective;" or that "it is possible in principle to find objectively the meaning of any symbol used by any person." He wants to know in each case of actual knowing whether

² He does not seem to be aware that the modern discussion of meaning started with Lord Russell's Aristotelian Society Paper on *How Propositions Mean* in 1919 and the Symposium in *Mind* on the Meaning of Meaning (for which I supplied the title and the first paper) in 1920.

the meaning *intended* has been successfully *conveyed*, and whether the abstract principle that symbols have discoverable meanings finds exemplification in the actual case. Accordingly, he investigates how meanings are in fact communicated. He observes that every meaning is to begin with personal—that is, that some one wishes to convey *his* meaning, by the verbal meanings of the words he employs. But he does not rashly assume that it is therefore “private and subjective,” nor that what is so is therefore utterly unintelligible to every one else. He insists merely that a *claim* to “objectivity” and communication shall not be mistaken for the accomplished fact, and that an inquiry may always be opened whether a personal meaning and a verbal meaning have coincided and been *correctly* understood.

He thus begins his inquiry at a point which the Chicagoans would seem never to have reached. I may be mistaking their (surely personal) meaning but they do not seem to me to have got clear about the relation of the objective to the subjective. The former they seem to treat as a self-evident given, and not as a difficult social achievement; while the latter is used merely as a term of abuse. Presumably this means that they have not noticed the basic subjectivity which underlies all our objectivities; and it is surprising that charges of “fuzziness” should be brought without any attempt to meet the argument for its existence. I had intentionally stated this argument on p. 5-6, in order to challenge all the ordinary brands of “realism”; but although my essay was read to about a dozen philosophic audiences, and then published, nowhere has this challenge been taken up. I can only continue to hold therefore that the objective realities of the sciences are in every case *selections* out of a much larger mass of crude appearances and experiences. If we inquire what determines these selections, our only possible answer is: the various interests and purposes of the inquir-

ers. These interests and purposes, moreover, are in all cases "subjective" in the sense held to be opprobrious!

3. I pass to the charge of "animosity to mathematics and formal logic." Here I must distinguish. Animosity to mathematics (or any science) would be a serious charge to bring against a pragmatist, seeing that pragmatism claims to be essentially the philosophic appreciation of scientific method. But all I have ever criticized is the philosophic habit of taking "pure" mathematics in abstraction from applied, as if it were the whole story. But the existence of pure mathematics does not mean that the nature of mathematical abstractions can be grasped apart from their use. It is due only to an accident of academic organization, like the assigning of the grammar and the literature of a language to different professors. It is true that pure and applied mathematics usually have different professors, but this does not mean that they are different sciences. In short, to cherish animosity towards pure mathematics is about as impossible as to show disrespect towards the Equator: what is fit to make angels weep is the way philosophers have misapprehended their scientific functions for some two thousand years.

4. Formal Logic is in a totally different position. I admit that I have long argued that it is a pseudo-science (or alternatively a game with words). But I have given three convincing reasons for this belief, and no formal logician ever tries to meet them. I wish that Professor Morris would attempt a rational defence of Formal Logic, but fear he will not. My reasons are briefly these:

a. Alfred Sidgwick has shown for the past thirty years or more that, owing to the potential ambiguity inherent in all terms, the notion of formal validity is untenable.

b. The basic unit of all the formal and symbolic logics, the

proposition appears to be non-existent. It is essentially a confusion and a conflation of a linguistic entity, the propositional function, and a psychological entity, the (personal) judgment—and so can provide only a *fictitious* basis for logic. Moreover this confusion leads to a systematic and incurable ambiguity in Formal Logic's use of the conception of truth.

c. I infer from this situation that the fundamental fact about Formal Logic is that it rests on an abstraction from real (i.e. personal) meaning, and thereby becomes an artificial and unreal game with verbal meaning.

From the fact that these charges have been before the philosophic public for anything between twenty and thirty years and that no one has attempted to rebut them, may it not justly be inferred that they are not answered because they are unanswerable? Of course nothing short of completely universal neglect can stop logicians from cultivating their pseudo-science; but they are not, surely, entitled to pride themselves on the degree of scientific contempt which they have already earned.

5. I will next take up a minor point. Professor Morris finds it difficult to reconcile my saying that scientific method abstracts from personality with my pointing out that it does so for the purpose of arguing from one particular case to another. Has it then ever occurred to him that, in order to obtain a general formula that can be transferred from case to case, the particular circumstances of the first case (place, time and personality) must be abstracted from? Of course this procedure imports an element of fiction into the use of "universals," "laws of nature," and the like; but this in no way invalidates scientific procedure, and it should be remembered that it was the astronomers who first discovered the "personal equation," of which the latest scientific instance has cropped up in the famous principle of Heisenberg.

What is truly deplorable, and has been so since Plato's day is the preposterous interpretation philosophers have sought to put upon a legitimate scientific procedure. I am truly sorry that Professor Morris has not been able to apprehend what seems to me the simple and straightforward argument of p. 6-7.

Having now cleared away the motes which have long been floating about in the philosophic fog and appear to have blurred Professor Morris's vision of my doctrine, I will endeavor to display the beams upon which his own case appears to rest.

6. He still seems to regard Peirce as the exemplar and standard to whom pragmatism should conform; yet the recently published fifth volume of his *Collected Papers* seems to show that this tradition stands in need of radical correction. In the first place Peirce himself reveals that James had exaggerated his (Pierce's) share in the founding of pragmatism, and that many other members of the Harvard Metaphysical Club besides Peirce and James deserve part of the credit. It appears moreover that Peirce himself had greatly changed his interests in the twenty years that elapsed between 1877 and 1899: he did not exactly withdraw what he had said, but he became very unwilling to sanction any further extension or application of his own principle. Particularly he had fallen completely under the spell of the old elusive ideal of mathematics, that of "exactness," and reprobated any attempt to carry pragmatism beyond the point he had himself formerly reached.

7. So it is not surprising that he had no appreciation for Dewey's work, and bestows only one contemptuous mention upon Dewey himself. But it is surprising that so many of those who profess to be Dewey's disciples should think it possible to combine Deweyism with formalism. For Dewey's

greatest discovery, and the core of his specific doctrine, is surely that of the need for constant reconstruction of beliefs. It is for this reason that science is progressive, and no truth is absolute. But how is this insight compatible with the old ideal of pinning down for all eternity the meaning of every idea by an exact "analysis"?¹

8. How it is possible to combine belief in formal logic and in probability is a further puzzle. Formal Logic has always longed for absolute truth and irrefutable demonstration, scorned probable reasoning, and twisted scientific reasoning into an alleged conformity with its prejudices. But, as persistently, probability has remained the guide of life, and scientific reasoning has remained probable and content with, at most, "practical certainty". Even the hypothetical reasoning of pure mathematics reduces to probability so soon as its application to reality is contemplated. Moreover, mathematical probability admits of an infinity of degrees. Absolute truth (or error), therefore, becomes an ideal which is never reached: in effect the notion becomes otiose. At the Prague Congress I succeeded in extracting from the chief German authority on probable reasoning, Professor Hans Reichenbach, an admission to this effect. I do not remember whether Professor Morris was present; but whether he was or not, it is high time he ceased to take it for granted that probability and demonstration are compatible, and addressed himself to their reconciliation. When he has *failed* to meet my arguments on these eight points, it will, perhaps, no longer seem necessary for pragmatists to disagree!

¹ At the recent Prague Congress of Philosophy I had an opportunity to put this point to no less a personage than Professor Carnap, who, very candidly, admitted that no *finality* could ever be claimed for any analysis. But does not this admission destroy also the greater part of its utility? Why torment ourselves to devise an "exact" analysis which may be antiquated next day by the growth of knowledge?

EPILOGUE—WHAT IS SCIENCE?

By HERBERT WILDON CARR

THE natural logic of the human mind is analytical. In our endeavor to understand reality we distinguish and separate, we abstract, and we classify. The goal of our search for truth appears as the attainment of the absolutely simple constituents of our experience.

This natural logic engenders a natural reasoning. The simple which is last in the order of knowing we think of as first in the order of being. The very fact that the concept of an element is reached as a final result of analysis suggests the idea of its indestructibility. The simple we think must antecede the complex, the homogeneous must be more original than the heterogeneous, the inorganic must condition the organic, mind by reason of its exaltation in the hierarchy must be the crown and not the basis of the edifice. So dominant in scientific thinking is this conception of an order of existence that to oppose it appears like a sin against the light of nature. For example, in biology it is taken as axiomatic that life originated in a very simple reaction of an unstable molecular substance to the radiating force of light. Yet there is no more real evidence that the primitive forms of life were simple unicellular organisms than there is historical evidence of the presence of an ox and an ass in the Bethlehem manger. In neither case does the belief rest on evidence; it is a pure aesthetic creation to give consistency to the image we have formed. Naturalism reveals alike its strength and its weakness when it rests its appeal on the existence of animal faith.

There is a logic which is not analytical but dialectical, which is not indifferent to matter and attentive only to

form, which does not merely prescribe the rules of reasoning. It is the logic of philosophy. Like formal logic it distinguishes, differentiates, and identifies, but its distinctions, differences, and identities are not classes of disparate entities submitted to an order imposed on them for the convenience of science; they are moments or stages or levels in the history and development of reality, conceived as the unity of a process. It identifies the real and the rational by raising reason, the Logos, to the self-active principle of life or consciousness itself, directing the organization of its own experience.

Perhaps the most striking and instructive example of this logic is what philosophy has named the ontological argument. Instead of extruding existence from thought, as we do when we distinguish the thought of a thing from the thing thought of, it recognizes in the highest and completest concept of reality an object of thought whose essence is existence.

It is the attitude of the thinker towards the object of knowledge which marks the real difference between the two principles, naturalism and personalism. It reveals itself in the two different concepts of the nature of existence. We may narrow it down into the acceptance or rejection of the ontological argument. To the naturalist, following the logic of science, existence must in the very nature of the logical work of analysis lie outside the concept; otherwise, as in the classical illustration of Kant, the idea of the hundred thalers would be identical with the existence of the hundred thalers. For the naturalist, therefore, as the basis of all valuation there must be a valueless existence. The naturalist in fact and of necessity postulates a dualism of thought and existence, a dualism he cannot reconcile and can never overcome.

The personalist, on the other hand, does not postulate existence, his own or another's; existence is given in the very activity of thinking. The problem which arises for the personalist is very different from that which arises for the naturalist. It is not how the mind can know nature if nature is in its definition unknowable. It is, how can thinking which is individual identify itself with reason which is universal? In knowing we either transcend our individuality or else condemn knowledge as illusion. The personalist theory is that understanding and willing, the powers of idealization and actualization, which characterize personality, do in fact universalize knowledge.

The mathematical construction of the physical universe, the great achievement of the present century, may bring in its wake a new alignment in metaphysics. Never before in the history of modern thought has the prospect been brighter of a rapprochement between physical and metaphysical science. Mathematics is inseparable from thought, thought is the activity of a thinker, and a thinker implies a subject of experience and the organization of experience by the subject. Put in another way, the quest of the material basis of existence, which science has undertaken, has ended in blank negation, in an absolute zero of existence. Mass has disappeared in the concept of energy; energy has an irreversible direction, it is increasing entropy; entropy is the extinction of existence, the end of actuality without any potentiality. All the mathematician and physicist can suggest in face of this blank end of his research is that in some way impossible to understand on purely scientific principles mind may exist and function where reality in its physical form ceases. But philosophy comes to remind us that mind is integral, it is indivisible, and it is uncomposable on any material principle. The mind is not a constituent or element or ingredient of an

organism. It is entelechy, a principle of wholeness and individuality. Mind will give us the principle by which the many are one, it will not give us the reverse principle by which the one is many. Therefore, to represent the primordial substance as mind-dust is to contradict the concept of mind in its essential attribute.

It is this very impasse that personalism, as I interpret it, avoids. The spiritual atoms, or monads, which compose the universe are not externally related but internally distinguished. They are not a last outcome of logical analysis but implied in the initial immediacy of the reflective act of thinking. The metaphysical basis of the universe is laid down in the beginning, implied in the immediate nature of spiritual activity, and not searched for as the final result of analysis, aesthetical or logical. It is impossible to give any meaning to existence except as it is implied in active experience. In all conscious activity existence is given. To search elsewhere for what we already possess and could not search for did we not already possess it is condemned from the outset as irrational. What, then, is the search for truth the satisfaction of which we name science? The answer can only be found by reflection on the nature of personality. A person is a subject of experience organized for intelligent action. A person understands and wills. We cannot and we need not define personality in objective terms, for everyone recognizes his own personality by simple self-reference; what philosophy seeks to determine is the precise nature, direction, and goal of personal activity.

Knowing is a twofold activity: we perceive and we conceive, we imagine and we think; and knowledge is of two kinds: the imagery of sense and of memory which represents the external world; and thoughts, ideas, or con-

cepts which objectify it. The one kind of knowledge we name aesthetical, the other logical. Aesthetical knowledge depends on sense intuition and is consequently subjective; logical knowledge has for its ideal pure objectivity, but in realizing this ideal the mind has nothing to depend on except its own constructive power. Science is the satisfaction of this logical activity of the mind.

TO A POET IN FEAR OF OBLIVION

By MARY SINTON LEITCH

The past has been the instant—that alone,
The space of a heart-beat. Time for you and me
Holds and will hold no more immediacy
Than it has held for those whose dust is blown
With ancient sands of Egypt. They have known
Night—and the dawn, and never shall they be
Reft of their hour, nor could eternity
Yield to them more than moments once their own.

Then why should we be fearful lest the clay
Shall seal our eyes to beauty? Time is spun
Of the same warp today and yesterday
And the swift instant evermore is one
With the slow years. Though mortal, still we may
Share the eternal courses of the sun.

REFLECTIONS OF A PERIPATETIC

VI.

By THE EDITOR

China the Mysterious

AS one approaches the China coast in the vicinity of Hong Kong in the late afternoon, he sees bare mountains rising out of the brown haze with the setting sun disappearing behind them. Sea and earth and sky partake of the same sepia tints, and the sun itself, losing its brilliance in the mists, becomes but a disk of beaten gold. Such was our initiation into the strange atmosphere of an ancient civilization, China the mysterious.

To the Western mind there is certain to be much here that will appear enigmatic, for the spirit on which it is built is foreign to Western concepts. All other civilizations have perished or have been absorbed in the changes that have transpired in the march of more than five thousand years. Here is a civilization which was contemporary with those of Egypt and of Babylon.

To the Westerner accustomed to the idea of progress, which involves kaleidoscopic changes that pursue each other in endless succession, this persistence of culture, of thought habits, and social custom, presents insoluble difficulties of appreciation. He who thinks deeply will inquire if in the very spectacle of this cultural persistence there may not be something which is of value to the understanding and perhaps something that is worthy of imitation.

By what strange social alchemy has it come about that China has subdued every conqueror transforming and reducing them to her very self and substance? How has she managed to go on unaffected amidst political changes, so-

cial upheavals and racial migrations that have elsewhere changed the face of the earth?

Must it not be discovered in that social amalgam which has enabled her to hold to a policy of pacificism and non-resistance? May it not have been a manifestation of that common law of nature which has removed the sabre-toothed tiger at the same time it has preserved the unresisting sheep.

But China has her silent means of opposition, which are more cogent for her preservation than weapons of war. She may not outwardly resist, but she can decline to cooperate. Her conquerors have never been able to impose upon her their language, their dress, nor their social customs in any but very superficial ways. It has ever been necessary to success in China that one must speak its language, adopt its dress, abide by its customs, accommodate one's self to its food and think moreover, after the fashion of the Chinese mind. When all this has come about, your man of whatever race has become essentially Chinese. One cannot live in China for any length of time without surrendering to it in some degree and one's success depends on the degree of the surrender. Let no one call such a race "effete."

This historically demonstrated fact makes the Chinese indifferent to those who attack them with force, since they have learned that it is only necessary to await the judgment of time. China the mysterious.

The Duke of Chou

One hesitates to give circulation to the weird and oft-times apocryphal legends so easily picked up in China as explanations of strange or striking customs. One of the most curious of these has to do with the unusual immortality that has been given to the Prince or Duke of Chou, whose

tilled figure ends the line of the cornice peak of every princely palace in China. These grotesques include, of course, the Dragon, and other protective divinities or principles symbolized in figures. They are presumed to ward off malicious influences of every sort from those who dwell within the walls. Indeed, the rank of the owner is to be ascertained in the number of these gargoylelike figures, only the Emperor being permitted the perfect number of seven.

The figure at the very end, looking precariously into space, is always that of the Duke of Chou. He is seated astride a hen in place of a horse. Astride a hen, it is said, because the hen cannot fly, as the Duke is reported to have done on one occasion: facing outward so that he cannot look back, eternally cured of his double-mindedness and pessimism. There seems scarcely justification in what we know of this prince for this perpetual calumny he is doomed to suffer, for he was constructive and a patron of letters. But "the evil that men do lives after them." Perhaps it is intended as a tacit recognition that, after all, with certain weaknesses eliminated, the Duke would be among the best of protectors. In any event, it is possible to discern in it the silent power of Chinese humor and to detect beneath the surface of slavery to custom a playfulness of spirit which abstains from taking itself too seriously,—a mark of genuine culture.

The Last Ming

The College of Chinese Studies in Peiping stands on the site of an ancient Imperial palace. In front of it are the tiled roofs of a deserted temple, now fallen to the baser uses of a coal yard. In the disorders that preceded the overthrow of his dynasty the last of the Mings resorted to this Temple, that in this sacred place he might discover the will of Heaven. As the father of a clan or family in China is

held responsible for the acts of his descendants, so the Emperor as the father of the nation was presumed in default of duty if any misfortune befell his people. Famine, pestilence, drought, flood, or even domestic disorder were held to arise from his failure to propitiate the will of Heaven and thus to keep the Cosmic harmony. The calamities that had befallen the state were seen as the natural result of his impiety.

In the attitude of prayer then he went to the temple and drew the fateful lot of life or death and found it against him. He committed suicide by hanging himself in the vicinity of Coal Hill. The victory of legend over common sense is to be seen in the fact that both tree and rope are pointed out, neither of which can be more than twenty years old.

Of the act itself there can be little doubt, since it was in keeping with the beliefs and opinions of the times, and the Ming was the last of purely Chinese dynasties. Herein lies the meaning of Sun Yat Sen's worship at the first Ming tombs in Nanking, his burial, and the establishment there of the seat of the new Republic. It was an appeal to Chinese nationalism that may have cost Manchuria.

The West frequently charges the Orient with political corruption, which cannot be refuted, but the last Ming, whatever his depravity, still retained a sense of responsibility and was gracious enough to remove himself from the scene of action.

In the West he would have blamed the tariff, the war, the depression, or an act of God, and would have stood for re-election.

Perishing Palaces

Can it be that the "grand age" of ostentatious display has passed away unhonored and unsung? The two greatest

palaces of the modern world, the Forbidden City in Peiping and the palace it inspired the Grand Monarch to build in emulation at Versailles, present the melancholy aspect of battered shells along the shores of time. Nor are these two most conspicuous palaces in any way exceptions to the general run or garden variety of regal domiciles.

Were it not for the name and fame of Buckingham Palace, no important movie star would deign to live in the decrepit building the King of England calls home. A casual glimpse at Holy Rood convinces that the Royalty of other days must have been a hardy lot to have survived its stony bleakness. It was a pent-up existence in what might figuratively be called stone armor.

In Munich our guide suggested that palaces were the most useless of all buildings, since they could not be burned down, nor blown up, nor removed. They were worthless as art galleries, museums, hospitals, factories, or even prisons. They belong nowhere in the present world-order, and possess but a mild interest for the antiquarian.

Yet these grandiose piles speak eloquently of the vain ambitions of those who built them, from Kublai Khan to Louis. They shout the hollow competitions of jealous monarchs who hoped to outdo each other in the flamboyance of size, of design, of secret rooms, and armies of servants. It was the ruling notion of the age. "He that is greatest among you," let him have the most servants, was their paraphrase of the command, "Let him be the servant of all."

If one is alert to the significance of events, he may discern not only the perishing of palaces, but the more meaningful perishing of ancient ideas and social concepts. The thoughts of men are changing, the ideals in which they once sought to realize their dreams have altered subtly and un-

consciously. The persistence here and there of anachronisms does not disprove the reality. The change is taking place without trumpet and banner; but because it is a displacement in ideas it cannot be stayed.

Dismantled palaces are the outward symbol of new tempers, of new modes of thought. Some will honestly affirm that this means social chaos, anarchy, destruction. May it not rather be the fact that our choice lies not between anarchy and dictatorship, but rather between the destruction of civilization and the achievement of a higher democracy than we have yet known?

One thing is certain, we cannot move back into those perishing palaces nor revive the thing for which they stood.

CURRENT THOUGHT

“The Philosophic Synthesis of the Social Sciences”

In a time when economic, political and social forces have been brought suddenly face to face, when the significance of past events for present action has become a matter of common observation, and when a Nature-conquering Man has once more been forced to ask the age-old question, “What is Man?”—in such a time the need of some philosophic synthesis of man’s social experience is evident. Of real importance, therefore, is the appearance in October, 1935, of *The Journal of Social Philosophy*, a quarterly “devoted to a philosophic synthesis of the social sciences.”

The idea of synthesis is as old as philosophy itself. Every passing metaphysic is a would-be synthesis. But the modern mind, accustomed to the precision and clarity of specialized knowledge, and aware of the apparent incommensurabilities existing between one field and another, is apt to suspect any general synthesis of being arbitrary and over-simplified. There is real danger here, and it can only be checked insofar as each synthesis submits itself to its own intrinsic principle, and recognizes itself not as a final crystalization, but as a passing moment of thought which must unite and change with a growing world. Thus any social scientist who does not relate his thought to that of the past, and exchange ideas with his fellow men not only in his own field but in others, cannot pretend to a true synthesis. And any philosopher who today thinks that a theory of social relations can spring new-formed from his particular brain has not yet awakened to the knowledge that the real social synthesis consists not in any theory but in the developing social world itself.

Such a dynamic conception of a philosophic synthesis seems implied in the policy of *The Journal of Social Philosophy*. Its distinguished editorial and advisory boards comprise a group of men representing a wide range of fields and many points of view. It offers no cut and dried plan, but invites thinkers of diverse opinions to engage in the free discussion of social problems with a view to their eventual integration.

“Pareto’s Significance for Social Theory”

The first number of the new *Journal of Social Philosophy* contains among other articles a symposium on “Pareto’s Significance for Social Theory.” Working independently, and dealing with different aspects of Pareto’s work, the several contributors to this symposium all conclude that as a social scientist the importance of Pareto has been much exaggerated.

William McDougall, writing on “Pareto as a Psychologist,” points out that though Pareto’s basic concepts, if they mean any-

thing at all, are inescapably psychological, Pareto himself reveals almost no acquaintance with modern psychology. That such acquaintance would have been helpful to him is suggested by McDougall's analysis of Pareto's terms, which, instead of being precisely and scientifically defined as Pareto himself insists that all "logico-experimental" terms should be, are hopelessly confused. Discussing "Pareto and Experimental Social Psychology," Carl Murchison shows that in spite of Pareto's demand that social science be experimental through and through, he apparently knows nothing of experimental psychology and has conducted no controlled experiments himself; and, further, that though he provides a wealth of empirical material he has articulated it so loosely that, though he may possibly be one of the prophets and seer whom he scorns, he is certainly not one of the company of Descartes, Newton, Maxwell and the like.

Dealing with "Pareto's Significance for Ethics," James H. Tufts dwells on a cynical paradox that runs throughout Pareto's work. For though Pareto pours scorn upon philosophers, statesmen, and religious and ethical leaders for offering nothing more than rationalizations of unconscious motives, and praises the logico-experimental scientist for offering the only method for a true sociology, he yet continually affirms that human conduct will always be non-logical, and that for this reason non-logico-scientific ideologies have a peculiarly profound value for regulating human conduct. In spite of this concession, however, Pareto himself is not impressed by these efforts to rationalize the springs of human conduct. For he is a pure scientist, aloof from non-logical values. Perhaps this is why he gives no recognition to his contemporaries, as Floyd N. House, in the final article points out, but remains apart, the great engineer of human conduct who has at least independently reduced the essence of life to pure logico-experimental science.

How can this nonsense of Pareto be, especially when it comes in company with vast erudition and unquestionable ability? I think that the answer lies in the paradox of a purely logical science which has as its subject an essentially non-logical material. Pareto identifies rationalization with falsification, and therefore seeks refuge from it in the ideal of a purely logical science, failing to see that a logical statement of the non-logical is inevitably a rationalization. His critic, Carl Murchison, also seems to make a dichotomy of the logical and the non-logical, holding however that the non-logical is the meaningless. For the scientist, he says, there can be nothing that is non-logical. The logical is whatever is the case. Any fact, therefore, however unexpected and whatever its material may be, is logical. Therefore, for the scientist the non-logical, the meaningless, does not exist. If such is the case, the scientist is certainly saved

from the necessity of rationalization. But unfortunately this statement represents the absolute end or ideal of science, and not its living actuality. For whatever it may be for the Absolute, science for human beings is a process—a process whereby the crooked is made strait, the confused clear, the unexplained explained, the apparently non-logical so rationalized as to appear to some degree logical. It is a process of rationalization. But it is not, as Pareto supposes therefore a mere distortion; rather it is a transformation or transfiguration in which the non-logical grows into the logical, the unconscious into the conscious, the lower into the higher. Such an interpretation of rationalization is of course, functional or teleological, and implies a genuinely evolutionary or synthetic relationship between the non-logical and logical poles of experience. Opposing it is the mechanistic, atomistic, logicistic view by which experiences joined in life are in theory kept eternally and absolutely separate.

H. Jeffery Smith

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

"It's a Long Sea"

Peter Pan is a pal of mine whose five short years belie his wisdom.

This was to be a high evening for the two of us, since the pictures of travel were to be run off for us alone. Together we were to enjoy the *cameraderie* that comes unexpressed to understanding hearts alone. Alas! that mortal enemy sleep came galloping on against the will, as he crept to my lap.

We were on the Indian Ocean, where a little bird, too tired to be frightened, had sought the ship, providing thrills unprecedented. Then followed a strip of sea and cloud, when Peter said, "Bompie, it's a long sea."

Yes, it's a long sea for bird or man. Newly pledged pinions will be sorely tried. Stifling heats, delaying winds, and boisterous waves test to the utmost. Before one gets his "second wind" the case will seem hopeless. Then, out of strength expended there comes new strength. Out of waves surpassed there come brave memories. Out of storms breasted there comes the triumph of the soul. Yes, dear lad, the sea is long, but "He made it and His hands prepared the dry land." At the end is the haven of desire—and sleep.

R. T. F.

Professor Gomperz Comes to Southern California

Coming to us from Vienna, Professor Heinrich Gomperz, well known for his work in the field of Greek philosophy will occupy the chair of Visiting Professor in the School of Philosophy for the second half of 1935-36.

Professor Gomperz, son of the great Greek scholar, Theodor Gomperz, reedited his father's best known work, *Greek Thinkers*, in 1922 and again in 1931. He is best known, however, for his many and varied original contributions, not only in his special field, but to philosophy in general.

Professor Gomperz has been professor of philosophy in the University of Vienna since 1920. He is a friend and former student of President Masaryk of Czecho-Slavokia.

OUR FOREIGN LETTER

The Revaluation of Confucianism

When we say "China" or see "China" or try to understand "China" we have to keep always in mind "Chinese." What is "Chinese"? It is the essence of a civilization five thousand or more years old. To be Chinese, any object or any act or any man must express, however simply, this civilization. If it does not, however it may appear, it is not Chinese.

It is this fact that makes the revaluation and reaffirmation of Confucianism of supreme importance for contemporary China. For Confucius reveals most clearly what is essentially Chinese. Confucius was a great philosopher, but he originated practically nothing. He was the middle-man, as it were, of Chinese civilization. He in his day looked back on the past and reaffirmed and revalued it for his own present, in the face of passing conditions which were antagonistic to Chinese tradition. Today we look back about twenty-five hundred years to Confucius, and we too, in the midst of difficult conditions, revalue and reaffirm for the present the civilization that is Chinese.

Confucianism is not merely a philosophy; rather it is itself the life of China, expressed in the attitude of the unlettered peasant as well as in the sage. For the Chinese people, though they are not all schooled, are civilized; and their respect for learning and cultivation is a natural expression of their common respect for past, for parent, for brother, for friend, and for the wisdom by which China has been ruled.

Today China faces the machinery and ideology of Western Civilization. There are some who would have China renounce what alone is Chinese and adopt whole-heartedly this alien tradition. There are others who fear that if China absorbs even the best and most fitting techniques and attitudes of the West, she herself cannot withstand the impact. But we who would see China continue to grow and yet remain Chinese see no reason why the philosophy of Confucius cannot be practiced with electric lights and a Republican form of government. But if this is to happen, if China is to become conscious and deliberate in her selection of ideas from the West, she must also become conscious and deliberate in her recognition of the essence of Chinese life. That is why it is of great moment

that China turn as she is doing to the Confucian philosophy in which Chinese civilization is most clearly expressed.

Between the great leaders of the world, Confucius and Jesus, for example, there is a community of thought. Between what in the long run is essential to the survival of Western civilization and that of China there is also no conflict. Only through righteousness and the recognition of human rights in a world of friendship can civilization anywhere survive. That is why I would cry aloud if China should give up her Confucian heritage and should cease to think Chinese.

Nanking, China.

Major-General Ting-Hsiu Tu.

Along the Bookshelf

The New Science

NEW PATHWAYS IN SCIENCE. By Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington. The Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, 1934. The Macmillan Company, New York, and The University Press, Cambridge, England. 1935. Pp. x, 333. \$3.00.

This book contains (with two additions) a course of twelve lectures delivered in 1934 in Cornell University, and is distinguished by all the lucidity, literary grace, and charming humor for which Sir Arthur Eddington is renowned. In it he brings up to date his interpretation of the proceedings of modern physics and astronomy, shirking no difficulties, and almost rendering credible even such paradoxes as that "electrons" are but "waves of probability" which enable the physicist to describe the disturbances which are called matter. As a scientist Sir Arthur is, of course, a first class authority whose masterly expositions cannot be challenged, and must be received with gratitude by the general and the philosophic public. But he also takes the opportunity to affirm sundry philosophic beliefs and to reply to a number of his scientific and philosophic critics; and it is upon these more controversial aspects of his work that in a philosophic periodical attention should be concentrated.

In general, Sir Arthur Eddington's replies may fairly be described as triumphant, all the more that they are phrased with the most exquisite urbanity. That this is no mean achievement may be gathered from the fact that his critics include such personages as Max Planck, Ber-

trand Russell, Sir James Jeans, and Sir Herbert Samuel, who attacked his attitude towards determinism and religion. Among the philosophers who suffer severe punctures at his hands are Professor W. T. Stace and Mr. C. E. M. Joad, who attempted to corner him on the old realism-*versus*-idealism issue. Eddington has little difficulty in repelling such attacks. For example, remarking (p. 278-9) that

non-technical books are very often a target for criticism simply because they are non-technical. . . . I take it that the aim of such books must be to convey exact thought in inexact language . . . a correspondent has pointed out to me that in various places in *The Nature of the Physical World* the word 'space' occurs with four different meanings. I think he expected me to feel penitent. But the word has these meanings; and inasmuch as my correspondent was by no means diffident in telling me what I really meant in each place, I inferred that in this instance my attempt to convey exact thought in inexact language had succeeded.

What could be neater?

In these days physicists have to teach the philosophers the answers to the questions they have ruminated on so long and ineffectually: but they are not all expert teachers, and the philosophers are often so chock-full of prejudices as to be inapt pupils and not to accept correction at all gratefully: hence Sir Arthur Eddington's methods of

philosophizing are simply invaluable.

Even he, however, could greatly lighten his labors and increase the effectiveness of his philosophizing by formulating his points more explicitly in the language of a philosophy more modern than that against which he struggles so patiently. When, for example, one finds him saying, "A feature of science is its *progressive* approach to truth. Is there anything corresponding to this in philosophy?" (p. 24), it is hard not to exclaim, "Why, of course, Pragmatism does!" When he gets involved in controversies with Max Planck, Lord Rutherford, and Sir Herbert Samuel about the scientific status of determinism, it is tempting to tell him that the whole fuss arises out of the foolish and totally unnecessary attempt to take determinism as an ultimate fact instead of as a postulate of method. When he explains (p. 290) that "in science we do not expect finality" and substitutes relevance for validity (p. 293 *n.*), one simply itches to tell him that he is expressing characteristic and essential doctrines of pragmatic logic.

Occasionally Sir Arthur goes even beyond pragmatism in the direction of personalism. He stands firmly by his former contentions that scientific "objectivity" rests on a subjective basis and that the scientific accounts of reality cannot possibly be complete, because they abstract from values (p. 312 f., though he does not use the word "value"), and repudiates the tyranny of the mathematician as much as that of the engineer (p. 323). So, in spite of quoting

(from Russell, p. 255) the old (Platonic) argument that science must abstract from individuality, he sees that "personification is not necessarily to be condemned as illusory. Am I not myself a personification of that scheme of structure which is all that physical science recognizes in me?" (p. 319). Does not this come very near to a recognition that just because the sciences all abstract from personality and this abstraction is a justifiable methodological fiction, there is ultimately need for a philosophic personalism which makes good this abstraction?

F. C. S. Schiller.

Social Behaviorism

MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST. By George H. Mead. Edited with Introduction by Charles W. Morris. Chicago, University Press. Pp. XXXVIII, 401.

This book is something of a *tour de force*. It professes to be a work of the late Professor G. H. Mead, and to contain the lectures on social psychology which he delivered for some thirty years at the University of Chicago, together with a stenographic set of notes of a course on elementary ethics (as regards Supplementary Essay IV.). Yet actually "it is in the main composed of two sets of student notes . . . together with excerpts from other such notes and selections from unpublished manuscripts. . . . A stenographic copy of the 1927 course . . . has been taken as basic." (p. VI.) Messrs. George Anagnos, Alvin Carus and Robert Page are mentioned as contributors of material, and the whole owes its present form to its editor, Professor C. W. Morris. He has performed his

task in a competent and conservative fashion; but it is possible that, as in the parallel case of Henry Sidgwick's posthumous works, the reader's interests have suffered from too austere an adherence to the ideal of scientific exposition. At any rate both Sidgwick and Mead possessed a sense of humor of which no traces are allowed to appear in their posthumous work. The edited 'Sidgwick' and 'Mead' therefore read like medi-umistic messages from the departed rather than the living men, and raise the old ethical issue how far discipular piety should turn into books lectures not intended for publication. The reader always suffers by this process, and all too often also the writer's reputation, in proportion as it was literary. In this case I should judge that the basic text was too conscientious: it omitted all the jokes and illustrations which must have enlivened the original lectures, but retained too many of the repetitions of the central ideas which are demanded by the lecture form. So the reader gets rather bored with hearing that man's intellectual development has been essentially social and that social psychology can be translated into the language of behaviorism. One is tempted also to think that the main argument would have been more convincing and easier to follow, if it had started with society as a biological fact and then proceeded to trace the development of social selves and the philosophic abstraction of 'mind', instead of reversing this process.

Not that I wish to dispute that the thing can be done. Behavioristic language can be used in any science, even as mathematical

symbolism can be used. Only this too is often a *tour de force*, which should be rendered palatable by some explanation of *why* it should be done, and of what precisely 'behaviorism' is to mean. It is notoriously as ambiguous as any word in the psychological bag of tricks, and seems to be justifiable only as a "methodological assumption," in cases where the minds to be communicated with are sufficiently alien or unfamiliar for the common anti-solipistic assumption that they *are* other minds, to be apt to yield doubtful results. So in dealing with animals, children and foreigners, behaviorism may sometimes be a good method to use *for certain purposes*, though even so it is never the only method that can be used. For we should always reserve to ourselves the right to use the alternative method, that of sympathetic interpretation, especially as even our most naturalistic assumptions, even e.g. "mechanical causation," imply "animism" in the last resort.

But *prima facie* social psychology is about the last subject that should be expected to lend itself profitably to behavioristic treatment. For, in spite of all the darkening of counsel due to technicality and pedantry, the existence of fairly effective human intercourse in a social context seems to be raised above all reasonable doubt; and if a case is to be made out for translating the easily intelligible language of common-sense psychology into the jargon of behaviorism, the burden of proof must be assumed by the latter. Hence it seems to me somewhat regrettable that Mead should have spent so much time and thought on clearing up his relations to behaviorism; he

should have seen that *as a metaphysic* it was merely an ephemeral craze which was losing the support of mechanistic physics, and was running ignorantly counter to every sound instinct of pragmatic logic. Fundamentally there is no reason why a pragmatist should ascribe to any method any absolute or metaphysical value; but he is entitled to use it for what it is worth for any purpose he may entertain.

Nor is emphasis on the social *milieu* of human intelligence the important novelty Mead took it to be. It was affirmed by Aristotle and Darwin ages before behaviorism was dreamt of; and no pragmatist would deny it. What the social psychology of the one and the biological sociology of the other need to render them explanatory of human conduct, is more detailed study (with plenty of laboratory experiments and references) on the one hand of how men manage to understand one another (when, and so far as, they do), and on the other hand of how they manage to live together and learn to respect the feelings and rights of others. In other words, social psychology depends for its progress primarily on the work of the anthropologists, not of the behaviorists or even physiologists. Why then should the fiction of a wholly external observer, unaware alike of the mind and of the purposes of the personages he contemplates, be supposed to conduce to a scientific understanding of human action? It is surely one of the most wanton and artificial mystifications of the academic temper.

Behaviorism bulks so large in this book that one has difficulty in seeing any connexion between

Mead's views as a social behaviorist and as a pragmatist. Yet it is known that he *did* combine them. Now the psychology which connects naturally with Pragmatism is a teleological psychology which recognizes the purposes and problems of thinkers who are stimulated to activity by their personal predicaments, and whose meanings are primarily personal. There need not be anything in such a standpoint to hinder it from developing a social psychology. One has merely to bear in mind that the thinker is always an agent who is also a biological individual who lives gregariously, and adjusts his behavior to his society.

But of such a psychology hardly a trace is to be found in the present book. Hence it is well to remember that as yet we have only fragments of Mead's thought. We are promised in the preface (p. V.) further volumes, on *The Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* and *The Philosophy of the Act*. These will presumably provide the natural context for *The Philosophy of the Present and Mind, Self and Society*, and should clear up much that at present is left obscure, enabling us to follow Mead's thought in its logical and psychological order. Perhaps also the editors will then explain why they should have chosen to publish him in the paradoxical and difficult order they have adopted.

F. C. S. S.

In Search of the Occult

A SEARCH IN SECRET INDIA. By Paul Brunton, with a Foreword by Sir Francis Younghusband. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 312. \$3.50.

THE SECRET PATH. By Paul Brunton. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 222. \$2.00.

AN OUTLINE OF MODERN OCCULTISM. By Cyril Scott. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 240. \$2.50.

POWERS THAT BE. By Alexander Cannon. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 221. \$1.50.

Paul Brunton's volumes start off with what for most readers are prejudicing titles. *Secret India* and *Secret Path* smack too much of hocus pocus and legerdemain to insure the careful consideration that his books really merit. Nor in the mind of the average reader is the prejudice likely to pass away because he speaks as if the spiritual were also the real, which is in bad odor in a materialistic age. There is little wonder, under these circumstances, that he has been severely handled by the critics, for he is not writing in their tongue.

Nevertheless what he writes is worthy of careful study, for it is not set forth from the viewpoint of a fanatic but of a man making an honest effort to discover truth. He recognizes that the great mass of yogis, miracle workers, and magicians are fraudulent self-seekers and yet does not allow this to deter him from hunting out those Indian sages who are evidently sincere and deeply religious. Where he finds these at their best, their mysticism is apparently in line with the best Christian mysticism and has a strong ethical background.

Of interest to the personalist is the fact which he clearly demonstrates that the practice of Indian philosophy and religion is not for the most part impersonal, a loss of personality in the Absolute, but rather very personal, a higher realization of the

self through unity with the Divine. If he is correct in this interpretation, there is very much more promise of mutual understanding between East and West than is commonly supposed, and philosophic personalism promises to provide a common meeting ground.

Certain it is that the West has much to learn from the Orient though the chief lesson is a simple one as he points out. The Oriental world is generally aware of the value of meditation. Too often the Westerner considers any direction from "here" progress. If there is much activity, a buzzing of the wheels, the blowing of whistles, he is quite content to imagine the forward march of civilization. Only occasionally can the average man be brought seriously to question himself. He is more anxious to be active. There are, as the author shows, undeveloped powers that must be sought within the spirit of man himself if he is to live worthily and well.

To the unprejudiced reader will arise, however, the query as to what is to be the outcome of the spiritual exercises of which he speaks with such confidence and enthusiasm. Are they to issue only in inward peace, sense of well-being, or of God-intoxication, or are they to be harnessed to the needs of the world? This seems to us to be the critical test between true and spurious mysticism of any sort, Buddhist, Islamic or Christian. Mysticism for itself alone is as much of a delusion and as fatal in its consequences as any other intoxication. As the practice of mediumship in spiritualism is disintegrating to personality

and character to the degree that the medium passes under "control," so the frequent inciting of trance states tends to unfit the subject for a normal personal life. This has been the fatal temptation of all mysticisms. The true mystic, as Professor Bergson has pointed out in his work on *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* is characterized by the dynamic force with which he treats the practical problems of life.

Mr. Brunton in his investigation is perhaps not so incredulous nor so critical as he would have himself believe. No one is more easily deceived than the man who credits himself with cold-blooded, scientific-mindedness, once his suspicions are laid by an apparent frankness. His evident impatience with institutionalized Christianity, and his obvious mysticism have led him to be impressed without too critical investigation. That a knowledge of his presence, of his object in visiting India, should be the subject of some esoteric communication like thought-transference, will not be easily credited among those who know the Orient. One might quite as easily wonder how the innkeeper in a distant Chinese village would know the time of arrival for the night and the size of his party, did he not know also that the workers in the fields shout his coming from hill-top to hill-top, along with his standing, his antecedents, and the probability of *backsheesh*. This information is conveyed far in advance of his arrival, and long before night-fall the village of his destination is prepared to receive him.

This curiosity of the Oriental in the foreigner is not under-

stood by the Westerner, who is a marked man in the marts of trade, but more especially so when he leaves the beaten path. He then has, however much he may deceive himself, all the seclusion of the proverbial gold-fish.

Cyril Scott writes from the standpoint of a thorough believer in Occultism. In *An Outline of Modern Occultism* he sets forth such a view and declares the universal nature of Occultism which makes it indigenous to all religions. The fatal speciousness of this sort of thing is its pretense to knowledge without learning and its appeal to the uncritical and superstitious.

Alexander Cannon's *Powers That Be* is a distinct example of what has been mentioned above, the ease with which the man who is certain of his senses can be fooled. Because a man is, or proclaims himself to be, a scientist is no particular reason for believing him when he is testifying to events outside of his immediate field of knowledge. The fact that cabinets, darkness, and lowered lights must be resorted to and all opportunities for fraud encouraged, makes this kind of evidence of little value. Scientific knowledge is open to all and never needs such subterfuge for its vindication.

R. T. F.

Professor Bergson Again

THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION. By *Henri Bergson*, translated by *R. Ashley Audra* and *Clouesley Brereton*. Henry Holt and Co., New York. Pp. viii, 308. \$3.00.

LA PENSEE ET LA MOUVANT. Essais et conférences. Par *Henri Bergson*. Librairie Felix Alcan, Paris. Pp. 323. 25 Francs.

The translation of Bergson's *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* is an eagerly anticipated event. It is to be hoped that it may reach the same wide reading as the *Creative Evolution*, for it is really the completion of that great work. *Les Deux Sources* was reviewed in *The Personalist* of April 1933 in the Special Bergson Number, and much space was likewise given it in the article by the Editor on *Bergson and Personalism*, to which the reader is referred for more exhaustive criticism.

We look upon this as Bergson's crowning work and one by which he may well be long remembered. His positions will not easily be granted either by the scientific mechanists, on the one hand, or the absolute idealists on the other, but his clear putting of facts, his sympathy with the scientific spirit at the very moment of his severest criticisms of popular scientific understanding offer new points of compromise and mutual appreciation between science and philosophy.

A recent review of this book appearing in a religious quarterly roundly scores what it considers its false theological implications. No better testimony could be borne to the essential soundness of Bergson's positions. For this is a book not of theological dogmatism but of melioration between theology and science. It offers the most outstanding defense of Christian mysticism of our time, and that by one who so far as I know has never called himself Christian. One can only think that the reviewer in question did not read, did not understand what he read,

or, was afflicted with mental prejudice.

Personalists will rejoice in that this work of Bergson yields the points for which they have striven and places Bergson definitely in their number.

The translation into English has been most excellently done, though the beautiful French diction of M. Bergson has of necessity suffered in the transposition. For our part the constant use of the word proliferate when there are abundant synonyms that are equally expressive set us to gnashing our teeth, but this is perhaps the weakness of a faulty disposition.

La Pensée et la Mouvant is the title of a collection of Essays and Conferences that appeared as lectures and articles in various journals between the years 1903 and 1923.

The first two were lectures given at Oxford in 1911 and form an inquiry into the method which Bergson would apply to the problem of Philosophy. Both discuss the relation of time to duration showing the mathematical and more or less artificial nature of the first and the real or experiential nature of the latter. Here in his judgment lies much of the misunderstanding that dogged the steps of the Darwinian and Spencerian accounts of evolution, for a real evolution is living, creative, and personal, that is, from within. We fail because our logic is habitually one of retrospection, after the event. The unity and causal connection in nature is something which is sensed by intuition as both change and duration are spiritual. The initial essays give the title and

main drift of the book which many will welcome in this organized and convenient form and which will be necessary to all those who seek to complete their collections of the Bergsonian philosophy.

R. T. F.

Philosophy and Sensation

AN ESSAY ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD. By *R. G. Collingwood*. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 1934. Pp. xii, 227. \$3.25.

THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION. By *Charles Hartshorne*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1934. Pp. xx, 288. \$3.00.

Professor R. G. Collingwood's *Essay on Philosophical Method* is an attempt to formulate and establish philosophically the nature and method of philosophy. Kant, he maintains, succeeded in showing how science was possible, but he failed in his account of metaphysics. To understand philosophy it is necessary to understand its logic, which Professor Collingwood holds to be distinct from that of science or any other of man's activities.

The peculiar logic of philosophy rests on the fact that for it the species of a genus overlap:

Mind, for the scientist, in this case the psychologist, is the name of one limited class of things outside which lie things of other kinds; for the spiritualistic philosopher, it is a name, perhaps the best or only name, for all reality. (P. 34).

The meanings of mind in these two contexts, though different, are not equivocal, for though distinct they are not discontinuous. Absolute mind com-

pletely comprehends but at the same time transcends specific mind. Both minds are in essence the same, but they differ both in degree and kind. This overlapping of species and genus results from the coincidence of differences of degree and kind, the former quantitative, giving the aspect of continuity, the latter qualitative giving the aspect of discontinuity. Their synthesis generates a "scale of forms" in which the mind as it were lifts itself by its own bootstraps, and raises its objects to higher powers.

In this scale of forms philosophy is supreme, there being no higher experience. With philosophy, however, the principle of transcendence is brought to a standstill, for according to Professor Collingwood since philosophy is the highest experience it cannot even conceive of its own transcendence, and this (the critic may add) in spite of the fact that in order to deny this possibility it is necessary to conceive it! At any rate for Professor Collingwood philosophy is in essence ultimate and categorical, whereas science and other human activities are at best hypothetical, pointing to higher forms of experience which they do not themselves fully comprehend.

Though not primarily historical, the profound and systematic argument here summarized receives ample and just historical and empirical support. Nowhere, however, does the author mention the clearest logical statement of the problem of classes, namely Russell's (and Whitehead's) Theory of Logical Types. It is true that Russell's conclusion is exactly the opposite of

that of Collingwood, but Russell's failure to accept the logical validity of the inclusion of a class as a member of itself does not invalidate his original exposition of the logical problem. It is a pity that Collingwood does not cross swords with Russell, particularly with regard to the logic of self-contradiction. Were he to do so he might be forced to admit that the logic of philosophy, like that of science, is hypothetical, and therefore does point to something higher than itself, namely to the life of mind as a whole of which logic or philosophy at best is an ideal abstraction.

Such an admission would help to clear up certain important though secondary inconsistencies which appear throughout Collingwood's argument. For, on the one hand he insists that philosophy is distinct in essence from art, science and other human activities. But on the other hand he maintains that they are really though unconsciously low forms of philosophy. On the one hand he attempts to divide the mind into autonomous activities essentially distinct in function, and on the other hand to unite it in a scale of activities tending towards philosophy, which is their ultimate.

He adduces numerous cases of philosophical overlapping from the fields of art and moral conduct, yet he seems bent on denying this in the field of science. He denies the overlapping for the mathematician of the concepts of straight and curved lines, maintaining that for the mathematician the concepts of circles with infinite and finite diameters are completely

distinct. (P. 29). But surely this is demonstrably false by reason of the fact that mathematically the finite and the infinite are not utterly incommensurable but are integrated in the same systems. Throughout most of his argument the author insists that philosophy is in essence categorical and only incidentally hypothetical, whereas for science the reverse is true. Yet in the end he shows that science is not altogether without benefit from overlapping, but leads naturally to philosophy, being a low form of the same activity. (P. 135).

In spite of these defects Professor Collingwood's essay forms an important and original contribution to philosophy. The simple beauty of its style, the clarity and rigour of its argument, and the breadth and seriousness of its purpose are enough to make the ordinary philosopher wish to burn his own work.

Of equal quality is Professor Charles Hartshorne's study of *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*. Like Professor Collingwood, Hartshorne is interested in revealing the continuity of experiences which are qualitatively distinct, and he does so with greater consistency. Specifically Hartshorne attempts to establish a new method of dealing with sensation, but the moment the meaning of sensation is made clear it is obvious that, within a limited context he is presenting an entire philosophy.

Sensation, Hartshorne contends, is not an ultimate, unanalysable, brute experience as any observation of sensation will show, for it is related to an

elaborate and continuous world of inter-related aspects. But, further, sensation itself intrinsically contains the qualities of all those entities with which it is related. These qualities are revealed, however, only in degree and from a sensational standpoint; perhaps it is best to say they are *felt* or that they are represented in the *meaning* of sensation. Hence the emphasis placed on the phrase "affective continuum". A further significance of this phrase is that the word "affective" serves to emphasize the qualitative character of the continuum which Hartshorne presumes to underly the whole of experience. For without this emphasis the reader might easily mistake the author's purpose and suppose that he contemplated a reduction of experience to quantitative relations. This error would be natural, for in keeping with his general position Hartshorne finds in mathematics the whole of experience represented in a mathematical way and from a mathematical point of view. Thus everything is mathematical, which might easily be mistaken to mean that abstract mathematics is everything.

Specifically, Hartshorne describes

the contents of sensation as forming an "affective continuum" of aesthetically meaningful, socially expressive, organically adaptive and evolving experience functions. (P. 9).

Such an hypothetical view of sensation

in one theory makes possible a binding-together of the results of many distinct lines of enquiry, embracing pure

geometry, aesthetics, everyday social experience, biology, metaphysics, and religious experience into a sweeping generalization capable of manifold empirical verifications as well as applicable to the clarification of numerous philosophical paradoxes.

To a remarkable degree the numerous applications which Hartshorne makes of his principle justify this claim. His comparison of the dimensions of experience and of sensation to the dimensions of color is impressive. His criticism of C. I. Lewis' absolute separation of sensation and logical form is well taken. As it stands, however, his own theory is too absolute, for though he demonstrates the universal scope and meaning of sensation, he has no clear statement as to the nature of its limitations.

To a certain extent Professor Hartshorne's views are a bold extension of certain of Professor Whitehead's. But his contribution is an important and original one which no philosopher or psychologist can afford to overlook.

H. Jeffery Smith.

Criticisms and Translations of Kant

IMMANUEL KANT ON PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. Translated with Four Introductory Essays, by *Humayun Kabir*. Calcutta University Press, Calcutta. 1935. Pp. cl, 90. 9sh.

RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE By *Immanuel Kant*. Translated with an Introduction by *Theodore M. Greene*, and *Hoyt H. Hudson*. Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago. 1934. Pp. lxxxv, 200. \$3.00.

Everyone is entitled to his theory of Kant. The present re-

viewer's is that he was really Humpty Dumpty, and that though he was awakened by his fall from dogmatic wall to skeptical earth, he was shattered into a thousand inconsistencies which, if the philosophers could put them together, would leave nothing but the rotund sleeping Kant as he was when seated on the wall.

Therefore the Kant critics will do well if instead of trying to reverse the fatal scene and show in slow motion what Kant really thought during his hurried descent, they rather attempt to make something new out of his fragments. Indeed, it is only through an appreciation of the essential inconsistency of Kant that the philosopher can benefit by his experience, and save himself both from a new dogmatism and a new fall.

Such an appreciation is shown by Humayun Kabir in the four introductory essays to his translation of "On Philosophy in General." For in dealing with this first and rejected introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* he insists that it should not be cast aside merely as a wordy and confused statement which led to the more systematic and correct statement in the final Introduction of the dominant conception of the third Critique. Rather he holds that because it reveals most clearly Kant's initial acceptance of the self-sufficiency of aesthetic intuition, the rejected introduction has a valuable innocence. This acceptance of the autonomy of the aesthetic, Kabir maintains, should neither be forgotten nor denied by reason of Kant's inconsistent treatment of judgment as pointing to if not actually realizing an abso-

lute unity of experience. Any "attempts to express the baffling varieties of experience in terms of a uniform formula" are doomed to fail. Therefore, Kant's insistence upon the intrinsic value of feeling should be maintained together with his tendency towards ultimate unity, a tendency which in the "last" analysis, Kant consistently and clearly limited. The first introduction is of particular importance, because though Kant passes over intuition hurriedly and to us naively in the first, he returns to it in his last and perhaps most important though neglected Critique. Thus Kabir holds

the most important contribution of "On Philosophy in General" to the Critical philosophy is to be found in its insistence upon the autonomy of feeling. This is implied throughout the Critical philosophy, but nowhere is it laid down so clearly as here that in the last analysis, pleasure and pain cannot be explained in terms of anything else, they can only be felt.

Mr. Kabir, a lecturer on Philosophy and English at the University of Calcutta is to be congratulated on his brilliant and critical contribution to Kantian scholarship, particularly since his work proves a striking exception to the tendency of Indian philosophers, in their just concern for their own great but somewhat scholastic tradition, to neglect the critical problems of epistemology which have been developed chiefly in the West.

H. J. S.

As long as man continues to exhibit so widely the religious

superstitions attacked by Kant in his *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, first published in 1793, so long will that classic continue to have more than a mere antiquarian interest. Not only does it reveal the typical Kant in miniature, but it exhibits likewise both the limitations and grandeur of his *Anschauung*. There is a dignity, sanity and cleansing power in Kant's view of religion, marred only by a lack of sympathy with mysticism arising from his fear of "enthusiasm". The strength of Kant's position is at once its sound synthesis of all that is positive and valuable in the iconoclasms of such diverse thinkers as Hume and Nietzsche, and its recognition of that dignity of man which not only points to the divine, but is fully achieved only by a reverence for it. The complete translation of this classic by Professors Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, prefaced by an extended introduction, is excellently done.

W. H. Long.

Philosophies of Action

INTRODUCTION TO GREEN'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By *W. D. Lamont*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 1934. Pp. 224. \$6.75.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY. A Critical Analysis. By *W. T. Feldman*. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 1934. Pp. vii, 127. \$1.75.

POLITICAL ETHICS. By *Daniel Sommer Robinson*. Thomas Y. Crowell, Company, New York. 1935. Pp. xvii, 288. \$2.00.

THE MEANING OF RIGHT AND WRONG. By *Richard C. Cabot*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. Pp. x, 463. \$2.50.

A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS. By *Philip Wheelwright*. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City, N. Y. 1935. Pp. xvi, 463. \$2.00.

Although untimely death prevented T. H. Green from making a final correction of the proofs of his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, this well known volume cannot be excused for its sonorous obscurity, ambiguity, and logical confusion. Consequently, its use as a text in many of the British colleges imposes upon the student a task at once unenviable and unnecessary. To correct this situation Dr. Lamont has written a condensed exposition of the work under the title of *Introduction to Green's Moral Philosophy*. His own criticism is confined to an appendix of about forty pages. The book is readable and clear, and will prove a welcome aid to students of Green. By way of adverse comment it may be pointed out that Dr. Lamont's argument for the thing-in-itself (p. 200ff.) is as verbal and as circular as those of his predecessors.

In spite of persistent effort to achieve clarity, Green's mantle of obscurity has fallen fairly upon the shoulders of his early admirer, Professor John Dewey. The causes that make for difficulty in reading Dewey are many. There is, of course, first of all the difficulty that follows the introduction of a distinctly new and exotic point of view cutting across the classical tradition. To this is added, in the case of Dewey, a poor style possibly resulting, it has been suggested, from a failure to correct or rewrite manuscripts. Furthermore, Dewey has taken liberties with words by radically redefining

terms with well-established connotations. Again, instrumentalism as a growing doctrine is subject to the vicissitudes of vagueness and shifting viewpoints common to such. In Dewey this is accentuated by equivocation and contradiction due to the espousing of incompatible interests. For example we find in his writings a vigorous adherence to an instrumentalist logic that lands in solipsism, and a consistent eschewing of metaphysics; while unannounced there is a silent shifting at will to an ordinary logic which permits Dewey to contend for an ontological realism.

In the light of these rather serious difficulties, Dewey, like Kant and T. H. Green, is in need of preliminary critical exposition if the student is to avoid confusion. Mr. W. T. Feldman has broken important ground in his succinct *The Philosophy of John Dewey*. This critical exposition will be found an invaluable prolegomenon to the study of Dewey's writings, even by those who take issue with the critical conclusions, and points the way for further studies of the same kind.

W. H. L.

Political Ethics by Professor Daniel Sommer Robinson is a pioneer textbook in applied ethics inspired by the regrettable trend toward a divorce of political thinking from moral theory. "Never has it been so essential," the author writes, "to determine from an ethical point of view what is the best form of government." In succinct fashion questions are raised and answered concerning such matters as the purpose of the state, the postulates and possibil-

ity of an ideal state, the highest form of the realizable state, ethical principles and applications relevant to international relations, the comparative merits of cultural monism and pluralism, the measures and rights of backward peoples, and an evaluation of the League of Nations. A final chapter presents thirty concrete problems for discussion. In general the author follows the lead of Hocking. One important omission is a failure to indicate clearly the principle, such as self-interest, duty, or the like, which binds the individual to the state. If this principle assertedly be found in Hocking's postulate of identical ideals, reminiscent of Rousseau's "general will," it can be shown that while it may be one that is true as an abstraction, it breaks down in concrete application. Furthermore, those with a keen scent for smugness will not be convinced that the writer has done justice to the undeniable merits of both fascism and soviet collectivism in his defense of democracy. It is easy to be over-optimistic about democracy and such asserted values as freedom from a usurping bureaucracy, freedom of speech, and academic freedom. If by Democracy is meant pure parliamentarianism, it is open to question whether or not it "must be admitted to be the most powerful form of government existing on the earth today." Whatever the values of democracy may be, and they are legion, it is scarcely wise to close our eyes to the values of competing systems, and the profound weaknesses of our own. This is a readable and thought provoking book, well annotated with reading references, which has broken ground in a good cause.

W. H. L.

With a brief acknowledgement of his indebtedness to the classical moralists Dr. Cabot in *The Meaning of Right and Wrong* has avoided a review of historical problems of ethics and has written an Ethics for Use. It is an attempt to draw from every-day experience the data of ethics, and is illustrated by examples from the author's medical practise.

Moral action is that which is done with or against a sense of obligation which finds expression in the making, keeping, and improving of agreements. Right desires, agreements or plans are those that are governed by reality as it shows itself in our needs. Wrong desires, agreements or acts are those which diverge from reality and from our needs through self-deceit. Right is based upon the principles of consistency in our agreements, which are the tools of ethical insight. Our greatest needs and desires are those concerned with "growth." An excellent analysis is made of what is involved in customary and legal agreements. What is understood or implied is often as important as what is written or stated. The difficulty of placing blame is illustrated by a number of specific cases where the conditions are not under the control of the agents.

What is called the psychiatric ethics of adjustment is contrasted with the revolutionary ethics of reform, with the plea that they should be allowed to fertilize each other, and that the adjustment to environment be supplemented by changing of the environment.

Supermoral action is defined as action that is carried on not from or against a sense of obli-

gation but because of the love of someone or something. Types of super-moral action are heroism, creative art, and adoration. Some unsolved problems of ethics are our duties toward animals, the right to produce life, the right to multiply men and the problems of eugenics.

Herbert L. Searles.

Professor Wheelwright's *Critical Introduction to Ethics* is a carefully prepared text which seeks to present ethics, on the one hand as a philosophical discipline, and on the other as a practical guide to human living. It is well articulated, following a clear cut method, and presenting a distinct though not a narrow view. The ethical value of a critical-practical attitude is in general stressed. It is humanistic rather than transcendental. Besides much empirical data chosen from many fields, the author in Part III, "The Individual and Society," applies his ethical principles to contemporary political and economic problems. Of particular value is the appendix, which includes bibliographical references to literary as well as strictly philosophical works. In connection with the chapter on "Humanism," for example, reference is made to works by the following: Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Fite, Confucius, Babbitt, Field, Krutch, Fernandez, Shakespeare, Goethe, Mann. The appendix also includes brief quotations from literature and everyday life, presented in connection with questions for discussion.

No work is altogether satisfactory. The reviewer, for instance, seriously questions the justice of dealing with "Christian Ethics," that is, the ethics

of Jesus, under the general heading of "The Idea of Duty," and the ethics of Plato under "Humanism." Nevertheless, the author does have a plan of attack, and his reasonable attitude towards various views does much to off-set any possibly false generalization. All the world loathes a text book, and this is no miraculous exception; but it is well done and is distinctly not the usual unprincipled hodge-podge presumably designed to appeal to the much under-rated student mind.

H. J. S.

Religious Thought

GOD OR MAN? A study of the Value of God to Man, by *James H. Leuba*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1933. Pp. xii, 311. \$2.75.

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN ENGLAND FROM 1850. By *Clement C. J. Webb*. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1933. Pp. 189. \$2.75.

THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION. By *Albert C. Knudson*. The Abingdon Press, New York. 1933. Pp. 512. \$3.50.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION IN VEDIC LITERATURE. By *D. S. Deshmukh*. Oxford University Press, New York. 1933. Pp. xvi, 378. \$8.50.

In *God or Man* Professor Leuba undertakes to estimate the methods of life offered respectively by science, and the religions, with reference to the effectiveness and range of these methods. The argument is that the God of the Religions, the superhuman being with whom human relations can be maintained, must be replaced. He points out that the physical and psychical forces at the service of man have been multiplied by science and describes in some

detail the psychotherapeutic achievements in the fields of medicine, psychiatry and psychology. These are contrasted with the works of salvation and healing which have been attributed to God in the popular religions. Dr. Leuba is of the opinion that the belief in a God who maintains with man the social relations implied in Christian worship leads to two major evils. First, the disregard for the value of knowledge in general, and secondly the teaching that the Christian God is the source of the virtues.

Mystical states and intuitions of the presence of God connected with religious experience are reduced to simple psychical elements which are naturalistically explained. The replacement of the religions is seen in the passage of moral education from the church to the lay school and the introduction of scientific methods for establishing individual and social ideals in the minds of the young.

After many chapters of proving that the God of the religions is unnecessary, and convincing the reader that he would have no need for any conception of God, we read

Let it be added that the solution of the problem with which we are concerned does not lead to an alternative between materialism and the spiritualistic metaphysics of the religions. What it does is to lead to a choice between the primitive conception of God—the one embodied in the religions — and some other conception, in our opinion an anti-materialistic one also. The materialistic sys-

tems of philosophy appear to us radically false. (p. 200).

This is a very good example of the faults with this kind of a semi-popular book, and for that matter with popular naturalism and humanism. Admitting that a deeper and more fundamental analysis would lead to an adequate conception of God somewhere between a spiritualistic and materialistic metaphysics, he does not do the work, first because it is difficult, and secondly because nobody but the philosophers would read it. It would seem that by this admission however, Professor Leuba has placed himself under an obligation to complete the task for which he has merely broken ground.

H. L. S.

The Olaus Petri lectures delivered by Professor Webb in the University of Upsala in 1932 do not profess to give a detailed account of Religious Thought in England From 1850, but rather a selective account of the philosophy of religion. The formative influence in western thought is an Immanentist tendency which finds expression in the doctrine of Evolution, the philosophy behind the Romantic movement, and the historical sense as applied to biblical study. The Immanentist tendency has been checked by Naturalism, by phases of Idealism which denied personality to the Absolute, and by the non-academic repudiation of Victorian codes of conduct since the war. The British Idealistic movement is credited with seeking religious values within the natural. The Influence of the Personal Idealists and the Pragmatists upon theological thought though not merely immanentist

was exaggerated by some writers to an extreme subjectivism.

The strongest reaction however against Immanentism has come since the war due to the breakdown of the ethical tradition. Failure to find within modern civilization the spiritual values expected has led to a quest of values from without. The author finds that the present outlook within the church is hopeful due to a disposition to deal with religious questions and problems with a spirit of candor and charity.

H. L. S.

Since there is scarcely a single Christian doctrine which is not inseparably connected with the *Doctrine of Redemption*, this work by Professor Knudson might well be regarded as a source book and history of the development of Christian Theology, and is a worthy companion of the author's previous book on *The Doctrine of God*. It is an attempt to face frankly the metaphysical problems involved in theology, and to answer them from the modern personalistic standpoint. After a review of the metaphysical views of the physical world such as evolutionism, emanationism, and creationism, the latter is adopted in preference. This introduces a problem, in that the doctrine of creation stamps the world as good, and comes into conflict with the doctrine of redemption which brands the world as evil. The contradiction is resolved by adopting the view that the doctrine of redemption grows out of the transitory and instrumental nature of the world and its apparent indifference to human ends. It is not dualistic and fits into the divine plan of creation.

The related doctrines such as creation, the soul, freedom, sin, suffering, and the person and work of Christ are seen in their historical setting and subject to criticism so as to make them acceptable to the modern mind. It is a dramatic illustration of the fact that there is scarcely a doctrine held today in anything like its original form. The major forces working toward this transformation are historical and biblical criticism, and the development of scientific and philosophical thought. Many ancient dogmas are held to rest upon logical fictions. The criterion where logic fails is Christian faith and experience.

The work of Christ in redemption is not that of making us one with God in the Greek sense, but the essence of redemption is found in the spiritual and ethical relation to God.

The book will be found most valuable for the purpose for which it was doubtless prepared, namely as a text-book in the study of Christian doctrine and theology.

H. L. S.

Origin and development are undoubtedly different aspects of the same thing. Were we to understand fully any process of growth we would thereby have discovered the secret of creation. But since growth is never fully understood, in actual practice it is one thing to deal with certain aspects of the development of such a phenomenon as religion, and another to attempt to state its origin. For the development of religion may be observed wherever religion appears, but its historic origin lies beyond the farthest range of the anthro-

pologist, and its psychological beginnings are equally obscure. It is therefore an ambitious theoretical as well as descriptive task which Dr. P. S. Deshmukh undertakes in his study of *The Origin and Development of Religion in Vedic Literature*.

The theoretical portion of this work is disappointing. Obviously religion began long before the Vedic period, yet little is said concerning the problem of its beginning, though there is an elaborate but rather uncritical rehearsing of familiar definitions of religion and classifications of its types. The author's own definition is not particularly illuminating as it might equally well be a description of a political party or a social welfare organization as of religion:

A religion is a social institution, having a set of principles, doctrines, beliefs, and practices, and certain more or less imperative rules of conduct which are in accordance with those principles, doctrines and beliefs and which aim at furthering human happiness.

Doubtless all activities have something of a religious character about them, but a more discriminating definition is necessary if the specific quality of religion as such is to be revealed.

The main portion of Dr. Deshmukh's work consists of a useful and comprehensive description of the religion of Vedic literature. At times the classifications seem rather mechanical, but the material is well selected. Noteworthy is the emphasis which the author places upon the social basis and significance of this religion.

H. J. S.

Personalistic Psychology

ALLGEMEINE PSYCHOLOGIE AUF PERSONALISTISCHER GRUNDLAGE. By *William Stern*. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 1935. Pp. xxviii, 827.

Professor Stern describes *personalistics* as the scientific discipline corresponding to personalism, the philosophy. This book, which adjusts the whole field of general psychology to personalistics, is the first comprehensive work on psychology to issue from personalism, and it represents something more than a mere psychological school. In it, the person is the sole object of general psychology, and all psychological data are constantly interpreted in terms of this concept. The broadest result of the complete realignment of psychological problems and phenomena which is thereby entailed is a transcending of all the traditional dualisms, like those of mind and body, consciousness and the unconscious, analysis and totality. The person is "neutral" as between any of these alternatives, possess its own dimensions, and can be described only in terms of itself.

In five parts, the thirty-one chapters cover the nature of psychology and the personalistic approach to it, sense perception, memory, thought and imagination, will and action, including a chapter on character which has appeared in English¹ and a discussion of Stern's well-known dispositions of feeling. While these contents suggest superficially that the traditional text-

book material has once more been set forth, the author indicates by various means that the arrangement is solely for convenience, the treatment always being novel. In the case of memory, for instance, the classical term *mneme* is utilized in order to discourage undesirable associations with the older psychological view of conscious recollection. Similar devices are employed elsewhere with the same object in view.

In the preface the author points out that "the personalistic presuppositions do not exclude other theories and points of view (except the purely mechanistic), but are related to them in a constructive way." One theory that is given ample scope is Gestalt psychology. As for mechanistic theories, no psychology that derives from any brand of personalism can fail to be teleological and to emphasize values in relationships of all kinds.

A large amount of valuable historical material, much of it drawn from Professor Stern's own remarkable and long connection with organized psychology in Europe, is concisely introduced. There is a classified bibliography of about six hundred titles. It is hoped that this new "General Psychology" will in due time be made available in English in its entirety.

Howard Davis Spoerl.

The History of Ideas

CONSIDERATIONS SUR LA MARCHÉ DES IDEES ET EVENEMENTS DANS LES TEMPS MODERNS. Tomes I et II. *A. A. Cournot*. Revu par *F. Mentre*. Boivin et Cie, Editeurs, 5 rue Palatine, Paris. Pp. xxxi, Tome I, 351; Tome II 376.

¹ "On the Nature and Structure of Character," *Character and Personality*, 1935, 3, 270-289.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Volume III. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. Columbia University Press, New York, 1935. Pp. 511. \$4.25.

The place and importance of Cournot in the development of French philosophy has been little noted by English and American philosophers up to the present. He had a formative influence in that less known stream of thought which issued through Leibniz, Condillac, De Maistre and De Biran, and coming on down through Ravaisson, Renouvier, Lachelier and Boutroux to Bergson and the intuitionist or personalistic school of our own time.

The reissue of this volume after more than sixty years finds a certain timeliness since it is more likely to create interest than in its own day. It was not until the flood of naturalistic speculation had spent itself and displayed its own unsatisfying emptiness that men could generally turn away from the worship of mere objectivity and call for a reconsideration of the universe which should include the observer as well as the observed. That day has at last arrived. Mechanistic speculation is giving way to something better and Cournot with his *Philosophy of Probability* has a message for our times. His denial of mechanical continuity is very good science now-a-days and his affirmation of the continuity of purpose and his concept of contingency have about them a modern ring. The work in question proceeds on the assumption that history is much more than the chronicle of military and political events

which engages the great historians, and proposes a report of the progress of the human spirit. His work deals with the state of mind in the Middle Ages, from which the modern era proceeds, and considers the development of ideas through the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, with one chapter devoted to the French Revolution.

The book will be of special interest to those personalists who would seek out the sources of the modern expressions of personalistic philosophy.

R. T. F.

The wealth and variety of material contained in the third volume of *Studies in the History of Ideas* edited by Columbia University's Department of Philosophy, necessitates a review in only the most general terms. Some indication of the scope and nature of the individual studies may be obtained from the mere mention of the following "An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms," by John Dewey, "Greek Genius and Race Mixture," by Matthew Thompson McClure, "Coleridge," by Rudolph Kagey, and "The Emergence of Space and Time in English Philosophy," by John Tull Baker. In assembling this group of studies, no attempt has been made to link them other than through the title; yet this collection represents a striking tendency in contemporary thought. It represents to some extent the re-union of philosophy with history and of history with philosophy. Looking back on the eighteenth century, we may smile at the unblushing way in which its thinkers hurriedly forced the

whole sweep of history into the philosophical formulas of the time. But the time has also come when we can look with a smile on the uncritical empiricism of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries' historians who had broken with their more philosophical antecedents. Today we find in almost every field the tendency to unite a just regard for facts with an equally just regard for general and universal ideas. The union of philosophy and history, of ideology with the whole realm of experience, illustrated in this volume represents part of the general reconstruction that is going on today. Ernest Nagel's "Impossible Numbers: A Chapter in the History of Modern Logic," is an outstanding contribution.

H. J. S.

Miscellaneous

SPENSER'S FAERIE QUEENE: An interpretation. By Janet Spens. Edward Arnold and Company, London. 1934. Pp. 144. \$3.40.

Janet Spens' "Interpretation" of Spenser's *Faerie Queene* presents us with a new and very suggestive analysis to be added to the long line of critical interpretations of this complex and difficult poem. She announces her aim as "to give back to English readers the understanding of and delight in this great poet which thrilled his contemporaries and early successors." In achieving this aim she stresses the claim that the epic was intended by its author to be a philosophical poem and maintains that the Elizabethan appreciation of the work was based on its philosophical charac-

ter. Her distinctive contribution to this new interpretation is her claim that the whole plan of the poem was altered after Spenser had completed nearly half of what we possess. He originally planned a poem of eight books, the first seven of which were to present the seven deadly sins and the eighth to conclude the poem. Then the poet became interested in Aristotle's twelve private moral virtues and shifted the philosophical basis from the medieval conception of sin to the classical conception of the virtues. This latter conception, which found expression in his letter to Raleigh, necessarily changed the number of books planned to twelve instead of eight. The changed plan also adapted itself to his desire to celebrate Queen Elizabeth.

Miss Spens' treatment considers six aspects of the subject, including especially "The structure," "The philosophic basis," "Symbolism," and "The love theme." The author's style is lively and aids materially in giving general interest to what is at best a most complicated subject for analysis. Miss Spens' arguments seem plausible in detail, though the reader is bothered by the fact that Spenser would allow the letter to Raleigh to stand as a substantial concealment of the double plan of the poem. Yet, whatever the critic may think of this or other features of her argument, the book remains a most interesting and suggestive interpretation of a poem that has done more to challenge the imagination than any other in the history of English poetry.

Louis Wann.

ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATION OF COGNITION. By *C. Lambek*. Levin and Munksgaard, Copenhagen, and Williams and Norgate, London. 1935. Pp. 106.

This little book, which is translated (not always idiomatically) from the Danish, seems to be the work of a psychologist. Its argumentation is succinct, clear and dogmatic; but it is reticent about its aims; and it is not easy to say what it seeks to prove. In general, the author tends toward the attitudes and conclusions (such as, that knowing is for the sake of controlling the future) which have been rendered familiar to the English-speaking world by the writings of the American and English pragmatists; but he nowhere refers to them, and does not appear to be aware that he has been anticipated. Nor does he carry his reasoning to any novelties, or extremities.

F. C. S. S.

THE GREAT DESIGN. Order and Progress in Nature. Edited by *Frances Mason*. Introduction by *Sir J. Arthur Thomson*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 324. \$2.50.

In spite of the rough and wholesale character of cosmic processes, to which attention has been called by such diverse thinkers as Laotze and Darwin, thought returns again and again to the ponderous manifestations of order and apparent intelligent purpose revealed in the world. If the problem of evil remains the most aggressive argument against theodicy, teleology is one of the most impressive and popular arguments for it. In *The Great Design* Mrs. Frances Mason has assembled a collection of brief essays of an impressive

and representative group of contemporary scientists, all of whom see in Nature the unmistakable marks of order, wonder, and mystery, and most of whom subscribe to a faith in the authenticity of the argument for cosmic purpose. For the popular reader the book is stimulating in scientific interest as well as in its *apologia* for theological optimism. The late Sir J. Arthur Thomson contributed the introduction.
W. L.

THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE. By *Merritt Moore Thompson*. University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles. 1934. Pp. 217.

The place of Gentile in Italian politics and philosophy is equalled only by his importance in the field of education. Sharing with Dewey the distinction of identifying education and philosophy, his thought deserves wider recognition in this country. *The Educational Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile*, a Southern California Educational Monograph, written by Dr. Merritt Moore Thompson, supplies for the first time in America a comprehensive statement of this aspect of his thought, and is a genuine contribution to educational theory. Gentile, as an idealist, places emphasis upon certain facts which are neglected by philosophic instrumentalism. In America we need a new baptism of emphasis upon spiritual values and culture, a new sense of the importance of creative personality, a new vision of the spiritual meaning of the State. Whatever exaggerations may be found in Gentile's thought, at least he can inspire in us a new higher common sense and a new awakening to the meaning of men, of life, and

of culture. Naturalism, however perfumed it may be by humanistic sentiments, leads in the end to decadence because its doctrine of man and life is without significance, and its theory of culture is empty. Dr. Thompson adds to his analysis of Gentile's thought an important and detailed analysis of his yet untranslated *Sommario de Pedagogia come Scienza Filosofica* and a translation of a note on the relation of teacher and pupil from Giovanni Vidari. By way of constructive criticism, it may be pointed out that the footnotes are almost unreadable (e. g. 48) because of the smallness of type. W. L.

THE HASIDIC ANTHOLOGY. Tales and Teachings of the Hasidim. Translated from the Hebrew, Yiddish, and German, and selected, compiled, and arranged by Rabbi Louis I. Newman. Charles Scribner's Sons Company, New York. 1934. Pp. xc, 571. \$5.00.

The Jewish moral and mystical movement known as Hasidism, which took its rise in the eighteenth century, is one of the important religious movements in modern times. Out of it has come a wealth of parables, tales, aphorisms, fables, anecdotes, sayings and exegetical comments, first orally transmitted and later put into print. *The Hasidic Anthology* comprises an extensive selection and compilation of this material, classified under two hundred and five headings. The work contains in addition an appendix, a bibliography, fourteen indices, and a lengthy preface outlining the history of the movement. As a treasury of Hasidic wit and thought it will undoubtedly remain the standard anthology on the subject. W. L.

DURKHEIM ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY. Translation by George Simpson. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. Pp. xlv, 439. \$3.50.

De la Division du Travail Social, which marks the definitive expression of Durkheim's earlier intellectual period, is an important book in the history of sociology and ethics. Under the title of *Emile Durkheim on the Division of Labor in Society* the English translation by George Simpson has now been published. Durkheim's thesis is positivistic and sociological. It follows that he conceives ethics to be a science concerned with an exact analysis of the factors necessary for the good life. Its purpose is to anticipate change and to adapt social thought and institutions to changing needs. In consequence ethics ceases to be an independent and transcendent sphere; it comprises the set of ideas, rules and practices making for social health, and arising out of the historical situation. "Whatever it is at any given moment, the conditions in which men live do not permit its being otherwise, and the proof is that it changes as conditions change, and only then . . . changes produced in the structure of societies have made necessary the change in customs. The moral law, then, is formed, transformed, and maintained in accordance with changing demands; these are the only conditions the science of ethics tries to determine." The general thesis of the work is the author's postulate that "the ideal of human fraternity can be realized only in proportion to the progress of the division of labor." The preface to the second edition, which adds notes on occupational groups (to which the

author looks for moral salvation) is of special interest, particularly in its warning that moral anarchy in general must follow moral anarchy in economics. "If in the task that occupies almost all our time we follow no other rule than that of our well-understood interest," he asks, "how can we learn to depend upon disinterestedness, on self-forgetfulness, on sacrifice?" The answer is clear: "... the absence of all economic discipline cannot fail to extend its effects beyond the economic world, and consequently weaken public morality." It is also well to take to heart Durkheim's warning that force solves no economic-moral disputes. Those economically "conquered, for a time, must suffer subordination under compulsion, they do not consent to it, and consequently this cannot constitute a stable equilibrium. Truces, arrived at after violence, are never anything but provisional, and satisfy no one. Human passions stop only before a moral power they respect. If all authority of this kind is wanting, the law of the strongest prevails, and, latent or active, the state of war is necessarily chronic." Mr. Simpson, both in his extended introduction and in the translation, has done good service.

W. L.

RULE AND END IN MORALS. By John H. Muirhead. Oxford University Press, New York. 1932. Pp. vi, 120. \$1.25.

This essay is an outgrowth of an informal symposium on the Idea of Right in Morals by a group of Oxford professors. The author traces historically the revival of Platonic study in Moral Philosophy in the sixties and sev-

enties of the last century, the reaction against it in the new Utilitarianism, and the more recent return to the spirit if not the letter of the Idealistic tradition due to the weaknesses of this reaction. The work concludes with an estimate of the adequacy of the reply of the latter and suggestions as to what must be our starting-point in Moral Philosophy in harmony with the more realistic spirit of the times.

Among these suggestions worthy of note is the stress on the distinction of the "ought to be" as against the "ought to do." There is a judgment of an "ought to be" implicit in all recognition of value. Right and Good, or Rule and End, must not be left disconnected in Moral Philosophy but must be regarded as coordinates.

H. L. S.

THE ART OF HAPPINESS, or The Teachings of Epicurus. By Henry Dwight Sedgwick. Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis. 1933. Pp. 191. \$2.00.

This little book presents a charming exposition and interpretation of the life and ethical teachings of Epicurus. An unusually penetrating and sympathetic analysis is made of the meaning of the concepts of altruism and egoism and their conflicting claims evaluated. Epicureanism is defended against misrepresentation and misunderstanding, and an apology is offered for egoism against the false claims of altruism, which has appropriated for itself the vocabulary of virtue. A justification is offered for the quest for happiness and the interpretation of life as an art.

H. L. S.

HEAD, HEART, and HANDS in HUMAN EVOLUTION. By R. R. Marett, M.A., D.Sc., Hon. L.L.D., F.B.A. Hutchinson's Scientific Books, London, 1935. Pp. 303.

The perfect writer of anthropological literature stands in need of three primary qualifications. First and foremost he should abound in sympathy with savage man, and be able to find in himself at least the germs of the impulses which determine his ways. Secondly, he needs a certain breadth of philosophic outlook, in order to rise above all dogmatism and narrowness. Lastly, he must have the knack of apt illustration and judicious selection from the vast masses of fact or alleged fact which anthropologists have put on record. It is rarely indeed that these qualifications are combined so harmoniously as they are in the person of the genial Rector of Exeter College, Oxford, who has gathered into this very charming and readable volume his contributions to anthropology in the last few years. For he possesses, in addition to the philosophic versatility of the trained 'greats' man, and a manual skill capable of whirling a bull-roarer or a war-club as expertly as a golf-club, an incomparable adroitness in the art of the *raconteur*. The result is a book of essays as entertaining as they are instructive. It is made up of four sections: first, three Presidential Addresses to the Sociological Society (1933-5); next, three Donnellan Lectures, delivered at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1933, on Religious Feeling, Thinking, and Acting. These are followed by nine essays of particular illustrations of 'pre-theological' religion, written for (a) the London Anthropological Congress in

1934, (b) a volume of complimentary essays for Professor C. G. Seligman, and (c) *The Manners and Customs of Mankind*; and lastly two technological essays comparing the Arts and Crafts of Prehistoric Man with those of the Modern Savage, republished from *Harmsworth's Universal History*. It will be noted that most of these essays have been written for special occasions, and that only the Donnellan Lectures have not been previously published. Nevertheless the unity of doctrine and treatment is such that the whole book coheres very well.

Dr. Marett's dominant interest is in primitive religion and particularly in its earliest stages. It will be remembered that he was the discoverer of "pre-animistic religion," and the popularizer of *Mana*; he now traces back the first stirrings of religiosity still further to the recognition of *luck*. He defines religion, ultimately, in psychological terms, as "an art of self-encouragement in the face of the uncertainties of life" (p. 145); and like all modern scientists he has to encounter the problem of relating process, progress and evolution. I am not sure that he solves it quite successfully and consistently. At any rate, while on p. 26 he is wary about confusing evolution and progress, and on p. 41 declares progress to be "evolution and something more," on p. 122 evolution is something more than *process* and is identified with a "progress according to some ideal scale," and p. 123 even speaks of "an evolutionary or purposive order." The discrepancy is doubtless only verbal, but perhaps scientists would do better to admit that they cross the Rubicon into

the fields of metaphysical interpretation and commit themselves to a subjective humanizing of happenings so soon as they conceive the sequence of events to form a *process*; after which it is only a further choice between value-judgments whether they conceive it as progress or as decay.

The book has a good index, and only a few (though rather vexatious) misprints (pp. 67, 229, 237, 276); while its characteristic humor may be gauged from a passage like this (p. 202):

If the civilized victim of a festal season calls in a well-groomed gentleman with a good bedside manner to prescribe the necessary pill, we speak of the doctor and his science. If, however, the sufferer is a savage who, having partaken too freely of a rather tough kangaroo, commissions a personage with wild eyes and a bone through his nose to scare the devil from out his stomach, we refer less respectfully to the medicine man and his magic.

F. C. S. S.

THE ARGUMENT OF PLATO. By F. H. Anderson. J. M. Dent and Sons, Limited, London, Toronto, and Vancouver. 1934. Pp. viii, 216. \$2.00.

Although he holds that "Plato is primarily a dramatist and not a doctrinaire theorist," Professor Anderson has hit upon the ingenious and somewhat original idea of compiling a consistent body of doctrines, a sort of *cento*, largely in Plato's own words (in translation), out of the contents of the various dialogues. As a *tour de force* his enterprise deserves, and in some respects

achieves, success, and exhibits commendable ingenuity and knowledge of the Platonic texts. But the plan of the work excludes consideration of most of the major difficulties of Platonic exegesis, and many will find it hard to believe that during a literary career extending over fifty or sixty years Plato's beliefs underwent no development or change.

F. C. S. S.

EXPERIMENT IN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. Discoveries and Conclusions of a Very Ordinary Brain (Since 1866). By H. G. Wells. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1934.

H. G. Wells' *Experiment in Autobiography* is a book of extraordinary honesty. The reader is left with the impression that the subtitle, *The Discoveries and Conclusions of a Very Ordinary Brain (Since 1866)* is not only true but was actually intended as truth and not as modesty. The problem which the book presents is how an ordinary "brain", growing up in the ugly drabness of lower middle class Victorian England, could have become perhaps the most influential writer in the world today. Wells explains it on the ground that chance threw him into an atmosphere of biological science. Given the principles of 19th Century biology — rationalism and empiricism — and applying them stubbornly to every phase of human existence, the "Idea of a Planned World" inevitably emerges. It is this idea that forms the culmination of Wells' thought. His novels are scientific projections, social hypotheses, pointing towards this end. His *Outline* (which, as he says, trained historians could have

done much better had they been willing to take the risk and the responsibility) was an educational venture pointing towards an enlightened society. Through-out, Wells' "besetting sin" is to treat man and nature alike as rational and planned—not merely in physical mechanism and intellectual thought, but in their blind and groping processes and intentions. Some day he believes the dreaming world will wake. That is the naive, touching, childlike faith of Wells, which reveals itself in his belief almost unique among radicals in the primary importance of the middle class, and in his trust in an "Open Conspiracy." No wonder the expert historians, the professional revolutionaries, the politicians and the worldly wise smile scornfully at his innocence. No wonder the ordinary brains of Tom, Dick, and Harry, who seem in one way and another to be slowly inheriting the earth, have bought his books by the millions. Perhaps his innocence contains some of the wisdom of the serpent.

—H. J. S.

A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS. By *Professor Sigmund Freud*. Authorized English translation of the Revised Edition, by Joan Riviere, with a Preface by Ernest Jones and G. Stanley Hall. Liver-right Publishing Corporation. New York. 1935. Pp. 412.

The authorized translation of Freud's *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* affords what is probably the most convenient and readable as well as the most authoritative text book on psychoanalysis for the lay reader. It should be remembered, however, that this work is based on lectures delivered in the years 1915 to 1917, and that in the

meantime Freud has in many respects modified his views, partly as the result of criticism and partly in line with the general trend in the field.

In a philosophical review it would be inappropriate to offer a technical criticism of this work, even if it were possible. As Freud points out, his results are the outcome of years of scientific practice, and involve such complexities of situations and subtleties of interpretation, that it is impossible to offer either proof or more than a very inadequate exposition of the theory. Added to this is the fanatical resistance offered it by those who make no effort to understand it, or to give it any credence whatsoever. It is therefore fitting to consider this series of popular lectures from the most general point of view, and in particular from the point of view of the philosopher.

The two major concepts of psychoanalysis are also those which stand in the way of its serious consideration, sex and the unconscious. The importance of Freud's view of sex lies in his demonstration that sex is not a narrow, isolated biological function, but participates in the life of the whole organism, including mind as well as body. Everyone knows and has known for centuries how true this is, but it is another thing to recognize it openly as a significant scientific fact. For there seems to be a fundamental fear of sex, deeper than Victorian prudery, a primitive taboo based on some inkling of the very unlimited potentiality of sex for good or evil which it seeks to suppress. But Freud has brought sex into the field of science as an important

attribute of mind as well as body; and he has enlarged meaning in a just and philosophical way. A reading of Freud's Introduction, however, shows clearly that Freud does not "reduce everything to sex," though he looks on all mental conflicts as conflicts between the two major aspects of mind, the ego and sex, thus providing a possible organic basis for ethical and social conflicts and harmonies between the individual and society. The ego, being more closely related to cold, hard facts, is less liable to illusions; man in his sexual or social life readily builds up illusion substitutes for realities, and these eventuate in pathological disturbances. Having said this in Freud's defence, it is necessary to add that he does not pay much attention to the ego aspect of these conflicts, but concentrates almost exclusively on sex.

Philosophers are apt to toss aside the idea of unconscious mind on the ground that mind implies the very consciousness which unconsciousness negates. Such a formal argument completely misses the meaning of Freud's great extension of mind to include what is ordinarily looked on as outside the pale. Just as Bergson looks upon memory as remaining alive even though it is not clearly but only unconsciously present in the knife edge of present consciousness, so Freud looks upon mind as extending down into what has hitherto been conceived as utterly unconscious matter—that is, except by idealistic and near-idealistic philosophers and laymen who have not had empirical grounds for their view. Surely it is time for philosophers, with-

out swallowing every detail of Freudian doctrine, to resist the panic of the mob and see in the concept of the unconscious the greatest empirical contribution, not only to idealistic philosophy but to the understanding of the mind of man, that has yet been made. Darwin showed the relationship between higher and lower forms of life; Freud has revealed the far more important relationship between the surface consciousness and the unplumbed depths of mind.

Some critics, of course, say that Freud's "mind" is nothing but matter; to this it may be replied that so long as it is matter which behaves like mind, that is, which behaves as though it had conscious purpose, it is pragmatically necessary to think of it as mind, no matter what we call it. It is not mind as stuff, nor mind as formal consciousness, but functional, teleological mind that Freud establishes. For to him there is no action, not even the most apparently meaningless and accidental, which does not have a hidden purpose. That this is true, even the common man is beginning to recognize, for whereas mechanistic, physiological psychology remains a highly specialized science, everyone has on his lips words and phrases reflecting the unconscious influence of Freud's ideas, and even his severest and most valuable critics attack him not on his fundamental concepts and method, but on the particular bias which he gives to them. Thus it is pointed out that he exaggerates sex, that he attempts to reduce an entire complex to one event rather than to an even larger complex of events, and that though

recognizing the place of an unseen power behind the conscious life of man, he yet clings to the naive ideals of Nineteenth Century mechanistic science. Jung may well be a better interpreter of Freud than Freud himself, but Freud, like Darwin, must be looked upon as the father of a science which will revolutionize man's human relations, which will eventually turn Socrates' "Know Thyself," into the more modern and more dynamic "Be Yourself."

H. J. S.

The Destiny of Men and Gods

THE ILLUSION OF IMMORTALITY.
By *Corliss Lamont*. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, New York. 1935. Pp. x, 294.
\$3.00.

THE PASSING OF THE GODS. By
V. F. Calverton. Charles Scribner's
Sons, New York. 1934. Pp. xx, 326.
\$3.00.

MODERN MYSTICS. By *Sir Francis
Younghusband*. E. P. Dutton and
Company, New York. 1935. Pp. viii,
316. \$3.00.

For the person who already believes in the merely illusory significance of immortality, Corliss Lamont's *The Illusion of Immortality* will be very convincing. For those who look for something more in this conception, it will not be particularly valuable. For though it presumes to give the complete scientific and modern case against immortality, it does little more than rehearse the obvious analyses characteristic of a dogmatic, mechanistic science. The most promising section of the book is that on the "Motivation and Symbolism" of immortality. Unfortunately, instead of analysing the biological, psychological and possibly metaphysical reality of motive and symbol,

the author merely points out the obvious fact that people believe in immortality partly because they desire it, and that they apprehend its reality not directly but symbolically. Were the author to enquire into the foundation of motives, and to compare the nature of scientific and extra-scientific symbolisms as representations of an unknown reality, his work might be of value. For certainly the notions of immortality which people have are in dire need of scientific criticism and re-interpretation. But apparently Mr. Lamont believes that the "modern" and "scientific" mind is capable of a knowledge which is not symbolic, which enables him apparently to hold the view that symbols are nothing but illusions. Thus he looks forward with faith to the day when "the illusion of immortality may entirely pass away, despite the alleged immortality of illusion among the sons of men." Such is the faith that is left to the disillusioned.

Of special interest are the pictorial illustrations which Mr. Lamont includes of life after death. The inspiration of these fantasies, however, is offset by an appendix of miscellaneous verse passages celebrating the finality of death and the joys of mundane immortality.

Not only men but gods are doomed to death according to V. F. Calverton's *The Passing of the Gods*. Unlike Lamont's, this work is an excellent and systematic statement of the best case against religion. No mere re-statement of an antiquated rationalism, Calverton attempts a clear analysis of the hidden motives at the root of all religion. In the background of his

work looms not merely the mechanism of physical science, but the human sciences of Marx and Freud, though his theory stands on its own feet.

The author makes no attempt to side-track the significance of non-rational motivations. Cultural compulsives determine even rational science. Therefore rational science must seek its own foundation in these more ultimate roots. What the author attempts to show is that science and the naturalistic attitude towards life constitute a full and harmonious realization of elemental motives, in contrast to religion which is a confused and dishonest attempt of man to have his cake and eat it.

Naturally, Mr. Calverton makes the usual distinction between true religion and supernatural religion. But it is difficult to tell whether in his acceptance true religion he means religion at all, in distinction say from mere ethics or economics. This difficulty, however, is inherent to his supposition that in naturalistic science is found a true and sufficient methodology for the interpretation and practice of life, a difficulty which is inherent to the views of Marx and Freud as well.

For the reviewer the answer to Calverton's critique of religion lies in the fact that the naturalistic point of view is limited, and that it must be supplemented by a teleological view of life, and a view of the ultimate reality and destiny of the world as lying beyond the limited natural order which we can apprehend. This Mr. Calverton might admit, but he would probably add that for man the known

is important, the unknown worthless. Yet is from the unknown that we and the gods are born and to which we return.

In Sir Francis Younghusband's *Modern Mystics* an evolutionary view of mysticism is presented. For in the mystic he finds a pre-view of the destiny to which all men may in the course of time evolve. That mysticism is not an aberration of the mind, but a fulfillment of the longing for wholeness and the struggle for ascent which marks not only every stage of life but seems to be implied even in the lower stages of matter, is the view which he seeks to support.

As evidence for this view he supplies a series of chapters devoted to biographical accounts of modern mystics, all but one of whom lived in his own lifetime. The reasonableness and goodness of their lives, the permanent value of their mystical experiences, and the higher quality of the realm in which they feel closest to the heart of things is very striking. For here we have mystics who have interpreted their experiences not in terms of unfamiliar dogmas, nor through outmoded systems of practice, but in the terms with which we are most familiar. Not that in the end the mystic can communicate his experience fully, for he can only suggest to us his mystical experiences through pointing to the lower mysticism of commonplace experience.

In criticism the reviewer calls attention to the danger of ignoring the reality of disorder and dissolution, in our eagerness to

seek the unity and harmony that the world also abundantly provides. And in conclusion he would like to enquire whether there is not a very concrete re-

lation between the author's interest in mysticism and the part which he has played in the attempts to ascend Mount Everest.

H. J. S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books not commented on here reserved for more extensive review.

- VALUE AND EXISTENCE. By *N. O. Lossky* and *John S. Marshall*. Part One Translated from the Russian by *Sergei S. Vinokooroff*. George Allen and Unwin, Limited, London. 7s. 6d. net.
- BYZANCE ET LES ARABES. De *A. A. Vasiliev*. Tome I: *La Dynastie d'Armorium (820-867)*. Edition française préparée par *Henri Gregoire* et *Marius Canard*, avec le concours de *C. Nallino* et *E. Honigmann* et *Claude Backvis*. Tome III: *Die Ostgrenze des Byzantinischen Reiches (363-1071)*, von *Ernst Honigmann*. Editions de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales. *Corpus Bruxellense Historiae Byzantinae*, Bruxelles, Belgique. 1935. Pp. xii, 251; 269. Avec cartes géographique. Paper covers.
- PROBLEMS OF CONDUCT. By *Durant Drake*. Second Revised Edition. With Six Concluding Chapters by *Raymond Holdsworth Finlay*. Prepared under the Editorial Supervision of *Harry A. Overstreet*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, San Francisco. 1935. Pp. xvii, 520.
- INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. Revised Edition. By *G. T. Patrick*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 1935. Pp. xii, 482.
- INTRODUCTION TO GREEN'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By *W. D. Lamont*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 224. \$2.75.
- ARISTOTLE: Natural Science, Psychology, and Nichomachean Ethics. Edited by *Philip Wheelwright*. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City. 1935. Pp. xlii, 224. \$1.25.
- BERKELEY-HUME. Edited by *Philip Wheelwright*. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City. 1935. Pp. xxxiv, 380. \$1.25.
- WHAT RELIGION IS AND DOES. By *Horace T. Houf*. Harper and Brothers, New York. 1935. Pp. 373. \$3.00.
- THE SUNSET HILL. By *Mary Pollard Tynes*. Verse. The Kaleidograph Press, Dallas. 1935. \$1.50.
- THE ACCURACY OF THE BIBLE. By *A. S. Yahuda*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. xxxvii, 226. \$3.00.
- THE CREED OF KINSHIP. By *Henry S. Salt*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 116. \$1.50.
- POWERS THAT BE. The Mayfair Lectures, England. By *Alexander Canon*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. xv, 221. \$1.50. Reviewed in this number.
- AN OUTLINE OF MODERN OCCULTISM. By *Cyril S. Scott*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. viii, 240. \$2.50. Reviewed in this number.
- THE SECRET PATH. By *Paul Brunton*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 222. \$2.00. Reviewed in this number.

GOVERNMENT IN BUSINESS. By *Stuart Chase*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 296. \$2.00.

CONCERNING HERETICS. An anonymous work attributed to *Sebastian Castellio*. Cone into English by *Roland H. Bainton*. Columbia University Press, New York. 1935. Pp. xiv, 342. \$4.00.

THE PROSE POETRY OF SU TUNG-PO. Being translated in English, with introductory essays, notes and commentaries by *Cyril Drummond LeGros Clark*. Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., Shanghai. \$10.00 Mex.

GREEK IDEALS AND MODERN LIFE. Martin Classical Lectures, Oberlin, Volume V. By *Sir Richard Livingstone*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1935. Pp. 175. \$2.00.

THOUGHT AND CHARACTER OF WILLIAM JAMES. By *Ralph Barton Perry*. Little, Brown and Company, Boston. 1935. Pp. 1592. \$12.00.

KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND OPINION. By *John Laird*. The Century Company, New York. 1935. Pp. xi, 515.

THE FREEDOM OF MAN. By *Arthur H. Compton*. Based on the Terry Lectures, 1932. Yale University Press, New Haven. 1935. \$2.00

INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AND IDEAL BEING. INTUITIVISM. Pamphlets by *N. O. Lossky*, Professor of Philosophy in the Russian University of Prague. Being Bulletins No. 1 and No. 12, issued by the Russian Association for Scientific Research at Prague, 1934 and 1935. Pp. 53 and 32.

ON THE POLITISCHEN IDEOLOGIE DER SUDENTENDEUTSCHEN. Pamphlet by *Emanuel Radl*, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Prague. E. Prager-Verlag, Wien-Leipzig. 1935. Pp. 4. Also an article, "The Philosophy of Nationalism," appearing in *World's Youth* for April, 1935, by Professor Radl. Pp. 40.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM. Pamphlet by *T. S. Chang*, Professor of Philosophy in Yenching University, Peiping. Translated, with the collaboration of the author, by *C. Y. Chang*, Professor of Literature in Kwang Hua University, Shanghai. Pp. vii, 55.

An attempt by a distinguished Chinese scholar to unite harmoniously the diverse epistemological tendencies of realism, transcendentalism, pragmatism, and legisticism.

STROEMUNGEN in der amerikanischen Philosophie der Gegenwart. By *John M. Warbeke*, appearing in *Die Tatwelt*, founded by *Rudolf Eucken*, for May, 1935. Pp. 13.

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	<i>Philosophical Horizons</i> American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow: <i>Kallen and Hook</i> . The Horizons of Thought: <i>Conger</i> . Knowledge, Belief and Opinion: <i>Laird</i> . A Study in Synthesis: <i>Cousins</i> .	
	<i>Plato: Debunked, Translated and Explained!</i> The Platonic Legend: <i>Fite</i> . Plato's Theory of Knowledge: <i>Cornford</i> .	
	<i>Social Philosophy and History</i> Pareto's General Sociology: <i>Henderson</i> . Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: <i>Cohen</i> . Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism in France: <i>Schapiro</i> . At War with Academic Traditions in America: <i>Lowell</i> .	
	<i>The Philosophy of Religion</i> The Mind of Paul: <i>Edman</i> . The Final Failure of Christianity: <i>Neff</i> . La Pensée Religieuse Française de Charron à Pascal: <i>Bussom</i> . The Farther Shore: <i>Griffin and Hunt</i> . A Student's Philosophy of Religion: <i>Wright</i> .	
	<i>Beauty in Man and Mathematics</i> The Poetry of Mathematics and Other Essays: <i>Smith</i> . Beauty and Human Nature: <i>Chandler</i> .	
	<i>Historical Studies</i> Aristotle: <i>Wheelwright</i> . Berkeley-Hume: <i>Wheelwright</i> . Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill: <i>Wheelwright</i> . The Achievement of Rome: <i>Greene</i> .	
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OUR CONTRIBUTORS' PAGE

With remarkable clarity **Mr. Louis J. Hopkins** discusses the *Changing Concepts of Physical Reality*. The fact of their change and growth he accounts for through the new recognition of physical concepts as intellectual constructions. Instead of regarding these constructs as fixed material entities, they must now be understood in relation to the whole of experience and to the experiencing mind. Mr. Hopkins, a Founder of the School of Philosophy, is a resident of Pasadena, California.

"*If There Be a God*" is not only the title but the challenge of the article contributed by **The Editor**. For to him the problem of good is greater than the problem of evil, and the need of a creative religion greater than that of a religion on the defense against limited and outworn attacks. In the *Reflections of a Peripatetic*, The Editor dwells among other things on the depth and seriousness of the *Jade Buddha* and on the spiritual triumph of *The Thief of Tsing Teh*.

For **Bishop George Richmond Grose**, *Edwin Markham: Poet of the Social Conscience* is no mere reformer. He sees man with a soul as well as with a hoe, and through this becomes a prophet and a visionary. The author of the article is a former Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church and a former President of Depauw University.

The view of symbolism which results from **Professor Emile Cailliet's** *Inquiry Into Symbolism* is one which associates it with the spontaneity of the primitive and the intuition of the mystic. It is itself symbolized in the words of a small boy: "Look, Mother! Look at this train I've made; it's not like that that it seems but it's like that that it is!" The author is Professor of French Literature and Civilization at Scripps College, Claremont, California.

According to **Professor John Wright Buckham's** study of *Interpretation*, "experience issues in a twofold self completion—interpretation (including evaluation) and Expression." These are not separate categories, but are functions together forming part of the growing mind. The author, a frequent contributor to THE PERSONALIST, is Professor of Theology at the Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, California.

Verse for this number consists of two sonnets, *Cosmic Urge*, by **E. Guy Talbot**, of Pasadena, California, and *Paradox*, by **Virginia Taylor McCormick**, of Norfolk, Virginia.